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Abstract 
 
The competing ideals of international human rights and global economic 
neoliberalism come into conflict when developing countries try to enforce socio-
economic rights.  This paper explores the intersection of economic globalization and the 
enforcement of 2nd generation human rights.  The focus of this exploration is the right to 
water in South Africa, specifically the recent Constitutional Court case Mazibuko v City 
of Johannesburg.  While a right to water can be constructed at the international level, the 
right disappears in the face of neoliberal development measures such as those that are 
instituted by democratic governments in developing nations faced with limited resources. 
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“The trouble with water – and there is trouble with water – 
is that they’re not making any more of it….People, 
however, they’re making more of…” 
Marq De Villiers 
 
 
“To deny the applicants the right to water is to deny them 
the right to lead a dignified human existence, to live a 
South African dream: To live in a democratic, open, caring, 
responsive and equal society that affirms the values of 
human dignity, equality and freedom.” 
Judge M. Tsoka 
 
 
“The wars of the 21st century will be fought over water.”  
Ismail Serageldin 
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Introduction  
 
Water is essential to human life.  It is also a scarce resource.   This impasse is the 
beginning of the debate over the nature of water.  Every human on Earth needs water to 
survive, and yet not every human has access to fresh water.  How to guarantee access to 
fresh water is only a part of a larger controversy over the duties imposed upon states by 
positive human rights.  Positive human rights are socio-economic rights, such as the right 
to housing, healthcare, and sufficient water.  In this thesis, I am disaggregating the issues 
surrounding states’ obligations in positive rights by exploring the nature of water.  If 
water is interpreted as a basic human right that cannot be commodified, then the actor 
that is responsible for delivering water to citizens is the state.  However, if water is a 
commodity, then it can be delivered to consumers through the market.   This dialectic 
illustrates the extent of states’ responsibilities in fulfilling international socio-economic 
rights that could be considered commodities.  Water has no close substitutes, and 
therefore the method by which it is allocated will have implications for people’s ability to 
access water for survival.  Understanding the debate over the nature of water is essential 
to understanding the complexities surrounding the enforcement of international socio-
economic rights in developing countries that are faced with scarce resources. 
There are thirty-six million cubic kilometers of fresh water in the world.1  Yet, the 
human demands for fresh water are beginning to outstrip the supply. There is no question 
that, “the problem of water supply…will become more political in the twenty-first 
century…[I]n an urbanised planet, with nearly eight billion inhabitants by the year 2020, 
                                                 
1
 E. C. Pielou, Fresh water (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 2. 
 2 
water will be as strategically vital for living as petroleum.”2  The population of the world 
is facing a global water crisis.  This global crisis will be felt mostly in developing 
countries that face scarce water resources and structural inequalities.  South Africa is the 
threshold of the international definition of a country that is “water stressed”.3  However, 
access to water has historically been intensely unequal.  South Africa first confronted its 
“water apartheid” problem in 2002 when faced with 30,000 marchers at the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg protesting the privatization of 
water services that resulted in unequal access.4  The right to water is enshrined in the 
South African Constitution, yet hundreds of thousands of South Africans are without 
access to basic water services.  This thesis seeks to unravel the impending water crisis 
through addressing the viability of an enforceable right to water in South Africa. 
There are larger global conversation and debates that frame this thesis.  These are 
conversations about the enforceability of human rights, global economic development, 
and water privatization.  These debates are still contested, and so this thesis enters into an 
ongoing conversation.  In order to frame the academic context for this thesis, it is 
important to understand some of the arguments that are being made in these 
conversations. 
The enforceability of international human rights is debated on a higher level than 
will be included in the course of this paper.  This debate has to do with the effectiveness 
of the current human rights regime, and whether or not non-binding treaties will actually 
                                                 
2
 De Rivero 2001; Shiva 2002, quoted in Peter T. Robbins, "Transnational Corporations and the Discourse 
of Water Privatization," Journal of International Development 15 (2003): 1073. 
3
 In South Africa in 1997, there was just over 1,200 kiloliters of fresh water for each of the 45 million 
residents.  Michael Kidd, "South Africa: The Development of Water Law," in The Evolution of the Law 
and Politics of Water, by Joseph W. Dellapenna and Joyeeta Gupta (New York: Springer, 2009), 87. 
4
 Patrick Bond and Jackie Dugard, "Water, Human Rights and Social Conflict: South African Experiences," 
Law, Social Justice & Global Development, no. 1 (February 11, 2008): 3. 
 3 
lead to the enforcement of human rights.    The neo-realist school of thought casts a 
pessimistic shadow on the enforceability of human rights, arguing that weak regimes 
without strong incentives for compliance or enforcement mechanisms will not lead to 
enforceable human rights.  If things happen because powerful countries want them to 
happen, as neo-realists reason, then human rights treaties do not seem to be enforceable, 
since powerful countries rarely employ punitive mechanisms to coerce other countries 
into improving their human rights records.5  The liberal international relations theory 
does not view the state as a unitary actor, and therefore believes that human rights 
regimes can be effective if internal actors use them to pressure their governments to 
conform to human rights standards through lobbying or lawsuits.  Thus, the liberal 
perspective predicts that enforcement of human rights would be more effective in 
democratic countries where the rule of law prevails.6  These are just two of the many 
perspectives on the enforceability of human rights through the current regime.  This 
thesis will primarily engage the liberal ideal, and investigate if the court system in South 
Africa can be used to enforce the right to water. 
Development can be understood as the “problematic of the transition from 
agriculture to industry…or, in a word, industrialization.”7  Conversations about global 
economic development span across disciplines, and engage in debates around equity and 
sustainability.  Two of the ideas that are touched upon in this paper are sustainable 
development and neoliberalism.  Sustainable development is a concept that has evolved 
from the Brundtland Commission to mean creating wealth to meet the needs of the 
                                                 
5
 Eric Neumayer, "Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?" The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 6 (December 2005): 926. 
6
 Ibid, 930 
7
 Jan N. Pieterse, "The Development of Development Theory: Towards Critical Globalism," Review of 
International Political Economy 3, no. 4 (Winter 1996): 547. 
 4 
present generation without compromising the ability of the future generation to meet their 
needs.8  Since the inception of the term, the environment – development complex has 
been treated through theories such as ecodevelopment, deep ecology9, and political 
ecology.10  Political ecology in sustainable development theory takes on significant 
influence in the context of this thesis in its treatment of nature-society relationships in 
conditions of the growing polarity in world income and wider political economic factors.  
Political ecology has contributed a poststructuralist voice in the development 
conversation that is concerned with power and discourse,11 and serves as one of the major 
frameworks for the analysis in this thesis.   
One of the power structures investigated is the power behind the neoliberal 
development model.  This model is based on the Washington Consensus, a term coined 
by John Williamson.  It includes austere fiscal measures that are aimed at attracting 
foreign direct investment as a means of economic growth.  Proponents of the neoliberal 
development method include international financial institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  However, it has come under heavy scrutiny, with 
critics claiming that it does not promote economic growth, it does not allow developing 
countries to implement the same protectionist policies that allowed develop countries to 
reach their current industrialized state, and that it crowds out other viable development 
                                                 
8
 Ellen Walkowiak, "Sustainable development as an Economic Development Strategy," Economic 
Development Review (Winter 1996): 75. 
9
 As coined by Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess. 
10
 See Blakie, “The Political Economy of Soil Erosion” (1985) and Blakie and Brookfield “Land 
Degredation and Society” (1987) for early political ecology. 
11
 Michael Watts and Richard Peet, "Introduction: Development Theory and Environment in an Age of 
Market Triumphalism," Economic Geography 69, no. 3 (July 1993): 227. 
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options.12  This thesis will engage in the debate over the effectiveness of the neoliberal 
development strategy through critically examining effects of privatization. 
Privatization of water resources is one of the more contested methods through 
which neoliberal development strategies are realized.  It is part of a wider debate over 
whether or not water is a private good.  As Ben Page describes, “In the war of ideas 
around global water management the battle lines have, increasingly, been drawn around 
whether or not water ought to be treated as a commodity”.13  Those in favor of 
privatization of water argue that privatizing water is the best method to ensure efficient 
delivery and allocation.  Those against privatization cite equity concerns and the ethical 
implications of treating a basic human need as a private commodity.  This debate is 
further expanded upon in the body of this thesis through a discussion over the nature of 
water and investigation of the effects of privatization in South Africa.  
The central question that drives my thesis is: Is the right to water enforceable?  
This thesis will be divided into four chapters.  The first two chapters will review the 
literature on either side of the debate over the nature of water.  Chapter One explains the 
origins of the idea of water as a commodity, and illustrates how water is commodified 
through two examples.  The first is the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, wherein water 
is sold to South Africa by Lesotho.  This case sets the scene for later examples, and 
serves as a geographical and historical introduction to the South African government’s 
dealings with international neoliberal economic institutions such as the World Bank.  The 
second example is the use of prepayment water meters in Johannesburg.  I argue that 
                                                 
12
 Ha-Joon Chang and Ilene Grabel, "Reclaiming Development from the Washington Consensus," Journal 
of Post Keynesian Economics 27, no. 2 (Winter 2004-2005) 
13
 Ben Page, “Paying for water and the geography of commodities,” Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 30, (2005): 294 
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these meters are indicative of market environmentalism and neoliberal development 
policies implemented by the South African government after the fall of apartheid.  
Chapter Two is a review of international law wherein I argue that an international human 
right to water can be constructed out of existing human rights documents.  Chapter Three 
is the heart of the thesis.  In this chapter I reviewed the text of the South African 
Constitutional Court case Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg at every juridical level on 
which it was heard.  I compared the texts of the decisions, and analyzed the reasoning and 
language used to interpret if the courts view water as a human right or a commodity.    
Mazibuko is the first case concerning the right to water to reach the highest court in a 
country, and therefore sets an important precedent concerning the possibility of 
enforcement.  This decision represents a new development in the field of water rights, as 
the Constitutional Court handed it down in October of 2009.  The South African 
Constitutional Court is internationally cited and respected for its progressive enforcement 
of human rights. South Africa in general offers a unique setting for the meeting of 
international human rights law as enshrined in the Constitution and neoliberal economics 
embodied in the economy and long-term interactions with the World Bank.  This context 
makes for a vibrant space to explore the consequences of the meeting of human rights 
and neoliberalism in the enforcement of socio-economic rights.  By the end of this thesis, 
I will conclude that the right to water can be constructed on an international level, yet is 
juridically unenforceable in South Africa. 
 
 7 
Chapter One: Economic Globalization and Water Privatization 
 
Economic globalization and the ideas of neoliberalism14 have produced the 
discourse of water as an economic good. The 1992 Dublin Conference on Water and 
Environment laid down the definition of water as an economic good for the first time. 
Principle Four of the statement that was produced by the conference states: “water has an 
economic value, and should be recognized as an economic good, while also maintaining 
that access to clean water and sanitation at affordable prices are fundamental human 
rights.”15 States and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, have 
chosen to focus mostly on the economic value aspect of this definition, as even the 
portion about human rights maintains that it is primarily an economic item.  The UN 
Panel on Water declared in 1998 that water should be paid for as a commodity rather than 
treated as an essential resource to be provided for free.16 This definition has led to a 
discourse of privatization in which the private sector is believed to be the most efficient 
venue to deliver water services to the public.17 Privatization “is a nebulous term, although 
unambiguous in political origin and coincides with the rise of neoliberalism…for the 
proponents of privatization it is the very incarnation of the liberal project.”18 In this way, 
privatization of water and its definition as an economic good is a result of the global 
neoliberal project. 
                                                 
14
 Neoliberalism will be taken to mean a “model of capitalism whose underlying principles include the 
primacy of economic growth, the opening of borders to capital movements, the removal of all restrictions 
to trade and the removal of government regulations which infringe on the operation of an open and free 
global market” Harry J. Stephan, Angus F. Hervey, and Raymond S. Fonseca, The scramble for Africa in 
the 21st century: a view from the South (Cape Town: Renaissance Press, 2006), 227. 
15
 Dublin Conference, quoted in Robbins, "Transnational Corporations and the Discourse of Water 
Privatization” p.1077.; Sagie Narsiah, "Discourses of Privatisation: The Case of South Africa's Water 
Sector," Development Southern Africa 25 (2008): 30. 
16
 Bond and Dugard, "Water, Human Rights and Social Conflict"p.6 
17
 Robbins, "Transnational Corporations and the Discourse of Water Privatization,"p.1078, 1080 
18
 Narsiah, "Discourses of Privatisation” p. 22 
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One of the central assumptions that paved the way for this definition is that 
governments, particularly in the Global South, are unable to deliver the necessary water 
infrastructure due to inefficiency and corruption. Therefore, international financial 
institutions and regional development banks have shifted their focus to encouraging 
governments to manage water resources through the private sector because it is believed 
to be more efficient and therefore more sustainable.19 Privatization uses the language of 
sustainability to construct “a subjective reality. And, indeed, privatisation produces 
particular forms of disciplinary conduct or, as Foucault…conceptualised it, 
“governmentality.”20 The practical application of this discursive strategy comes in 
foreign direct investment (FDI) by transnational corporations (TNCs) in the water sector, 
and neoliberal development strategies used by developing countries.  
Though neoclassical economic arguments assert that water is allocated more 
efficiently through the private sector,21 there is a contrary theory known as the “global 
reach argument.” This logic is based on the idea that FDI is a part of the strategy of 
globalizing firms as opposed to a simple resource flow. TNCs become global institutions 
that actively produce imperfect markets in order to increase profits. Instead of increasing 
efficiency in water delivery and infrastructure, they “reduce it by making markets less 
perfect as a result of their own need to control, reduce, or eliminate competition and 
maximise surplus profits.”22 Thus, the constructed reality of efficiency that is conveyed in 
the discourse of privatization could be seen to as a means to the neoliberal goal of profit 
maximization. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has yet to rule on issues of water 
                                                 
19
 Robbins, "Transnational Corporations and the Discourse of Water Privatization,"p.1074 
20
 Narsiah, "Discourses of Privatisation,” p.22 
21
 Robbins, "Transnational Corporations and the Discourse of Water Privatization,"p.1075; Narsiah, 
"Discourses of Privatisation,” p.22 
22
 Robbins, "Transnational Corporations and the Discourse of Water Privatization," p.1075 
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privatization, specifically bulk water exports. However, it has traditionally upheld 
economic interests over environmental and human rights concerns.23 The WTO disallows 
obstacles to the trade of commodities. If water continues to be defined as a commodity, it 
is entirely possible that the WTO will not wish to stop the sale of water.24  
Economic globalization in the form of neoliberalism has produced a discourse of 
privatization and commodification of water, which has affected the governmentality of 
water management.  Water supply has been fundamental in the internal politics of 
African state-craft, and neoliberal discourses have affected the way in which water policy 
is formed in these developing countries.  Governments in Southern Africa are under 
increasing pressure to apply “integrated water resource management approaches which 
strive for economic growth within natural resource availability constraints.  According to 
Dr. Larry Swatuk, the director of the International Development Program at the 
University of Waterloo, this approach often leads to deepening inequalities in water use 
and worsening resource degradation.25  The privatization of basic services, including 
water, became a serious option for municipalities in South Africa during the 1990s when 
government restructuring made financially sustainable basic service programs 
untenable.26  Johannesburg privatized its municipal water service in 2001 with a new 
municipal entity, called Johannesburg Water, completely owned by the City of 
Johannesburg, but fully corporatized and operating under private laws.  Johannesburg 
                                                 
23
 Naser Faruqui, "Balancing between the Eternal Yesterday and the Eternal Tomorrow: Economic 
Globalization, Water, and Equity," in Rethinking water management: innovative approaches to 
contemporary issues, by Caroline Figuères, Johan Rockström, and Cecilia Tortajada (London: Earthscan 
Publications, 2003), 57. 
24
 Aaron T. Wolf, "The Present and Future of Transboundary Water Management," in Rethinking water 
management: innovative approaches to contemporary issues, by Caroline Figuères, Johan Rockström, and 
Cecilia Tortajada (London: Earthscan Publications, 2003), 175. 
25
 Swatuk qtd in Joost Fontein, "The Power of Water: Landscape, Water, and the State in Southern and 
Eastern Africa: An Introduction," Journal of Southern African Studies 34 (2008): 741. 
26
 Narsiah, "Discourses of Privatisation,” p.22 
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Water entered into a five-year management contract with Suez Environment, a 
multinational water management company that operated worldwide.  The objectives of 
this management contract were to make Johannesburg Water into a professionally run 
and efficient corporatized utility that is financially viable (not dependent on subsidies or 
budget transfers from the City) without drastic increases in water tariffs.27  The effects of 
the privatization of water services in Johannesburg is further illustrated below in the 
discussion of pre-paid water meters as a means of fully recovering costs, and in Chapter 
4, which discusses the case Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg, wherein the prepayment 
meters were challenged on Constitutional grounds. 
 
1.1 Market Environmentalism 
 
 One of the ways that neoliberal development strategies have entered the realm of 
developing-country economic policy is through market environmentalism.  Karen Bakker 
defines market environmentalism as:  
[A] virtuous vision of fusion of economic growth, efficiency, and 
environmental conservation: through establishing private property rights, 
employing markets as allocation mechanisms, and incorporating 
environmental externalities through pricing, proponents of market 
environmentalism assert that environmental goods will be more efficiently 
allocated if treated as economic goods – thereby simultaneously 
addressing concerns over environmental degradation and inefficient use of 
resources.28 
 
Supporters of market environmentalism in the water sector argue that water is an 
increasingly scarce resource which must be priced at full economic and environmental 
cost if is it going to be allocated efficiently to its highest value uses.  They argue that 
                                                 
27
 Jean-Pierre Mas, "The Need to Reconcile Efficiency and Equity - The Johannesburg Case Study," MS 
IWA-1212R1, JOWAM - Johannesburg Water Management, Johannesburg. 
28
 Karen Bakker, "The "Commons" Versus the "Commodity": Alter-globalization, Anti-privatization and 
the Human Right to Water in the Global South," Antipode (2007): 432. 
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water must be managed by private companies that are accountable to customers.  This 
will be more efficient and effective than management by municipalities, whose 
accountability comes from citizen-elected representatives, and are much slower to 
respond.  Opponents of market environmentalism in the water sector argue that water is a 
resource that is essential for life and has no substitutes.  They say that water is a human 
right, which they argue places a burden on the state to provide free water and precludes 
private sector involvement.29 
 The following case studies illustrate market environmentalism in South Africa.  
The first is the case of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, which is framed as a 
sustainable development project by the World Bank.  The second is the installation of 
prepayment water meters in Johannesburg, a practice that has been described as a water-
saving measure by Suez-run Johannesburg Water.  In these two cases, it is possible to see 
the effects of market environmentalism in South African water policy, both on the 
international and municipal scale.   
 
1.1.1. Lesotho Highlands Water Project 
 
The Orange River originates in Lesotho and runs through South Africa, creating a 
border with Namibia before finally emptying into the Atlantic Ocean.  The Lesotho 
Highlands Water Project is a product of a deal brokered between the apartheid 
government of South Africa and a military government in Lesotho in 1986.  It was 
conceived as a plan to export water on an unprecedented scale from Lesotho to South 
Africa’s industrial heartland of Johannesburg and Pretoria. It was accomplished by 
                                                 
29
 Bakker, "The ‘Commons’ Versus the ‘Commodity’," p.432 
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storing the water in the Orange River and channeling it northward through a 115 km-long 
tunnel.  A secondary aim was to provide Lesotho with a source of hydroelectricity.30  The 
project began with the construction of the Katse Dam (Phase 1A), and the first phase was 
completed in 1997 with the aid of international organizations, including the World Bank.  
The second phase of the project (Phase 1B) was appraised by the World Bank in 1996, 
after the first phase was finished.  The remaining phases of the LHWP are seen as an 
important development project by the government of South Africa that will bring badly 
needed resources to the water-poor Gauteng province, the province where Johannesburg 
is located.  President Mandela described South Africa’s post-apartheid position on the 
project: “We in South Africa need the water from the LHWP to meet the increase in our 
demand, and, in particular, to meet the needs of previously neglected communities.”31  It 
is exhibited by the government as a project that will benefit the poor of South Africa and 
Lesotho through the help of the World Bank and transnational corporations that promote 
the sustainable use of the Orange River basin while stimulating development.   
The way in which the project has been framed by the World Bank and the South 
African government has shaped the way that people view and act toward it.  The actors 
involved in the LHWP have shaped the way it is described to reflect the global 
environmental ideal of sustainable development, an ideal that can be contradictory to (but 
is not necessarily in opposition to) neoliberalism.  In other words, they have used the 
language of market environmentalism to describe the Project.  These actors include the 
World Bank on the supply-side and transnational corporations, which manage the 
                                                 
30
 Korinna Horta, "The Mountain Kingdom's White Oil," The Ecologist, 6th ser. (November 12, 1995): 
227. 
31
 Mandela, quoted in Patrick Bond, Unsustainable South Africa: environment, development and social 
protest (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2002), 128. 
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demand-side of the project. They have used this discourse to describe the way in which 
the infrastructure introduced as a result of the project will impact people’s lives. 
Neoliberal discourses and motives are hidden behind the sustainable development 
rhetoric. This is inevitable given the current global economic situation and the common 
definition of water as an economic good.32 The World Bank and TNCs use sustainable 
development discourse in the case of the LHWP to strike a balance between growth and 
global distributive justice,33 and thus to appeal to all interest groups involved in the 
Lesotho and South African sides of the project. 
The World Bank’s involvement in the LHWP has been extensive from the 
beginning.  The Bank took the role of “central organiser of technical, financial, social and 
ecological information about the LHWP, and will continue in this vein in the future.”34 
Although the original loan was given to Lesotho, it was only the nominal borrower. South 
Africa was actually responsible for repaying the debt and servicing the loans, though at 
the time of the original loan, they were the subject of economic sanctions and therefore 
not technically allowed to be a recipient of loans.35 Due to the political climate at the 
time, it appears that the project was originally “in-part a sanctions-busting, prestige 
project with…geo-political overtones,”36 which necessitated the involvement of the 
World Bank at a high level of governance of the project and therefore of the 
transboundary watercourse that resulted. The Bank and its Inspection Panel moved into a 
role of “bureaucratic rationality” that is traditionally associated with the nation-state.37 
                                                 
32
 Robbins, "Transnational Corporations and the Discourse of Water Privatization," p.1074 
33
 Harvey, quoted in Bond, Unsustainable South Africa, p.162 
34
 Bond, Unsustainable South Africa, p.136 
35
 Horta, "The Mountain Kingdom's White Oil," p.228 
36
 Bond, Unsustainable South Africa p.162 
37
 Bond, Unsustainable South Africa, p.162 
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The fact that the World Bank had taken on this role makes the language they used of 
primary importance for the outcome and impacts of the project. A closer inspection of the 
actions of the World Bank and its subsidiaries shows that the sustainable development 
discourse was driven by economic concerns and was working in concert with a neoliberal 
agenda rooted in an understanding of water as a commodity. 
The aim of the LHWP is to divert about 40 percent of the water in the Senqu 
River basin into South Africa’s Vaal River system in Gauteng province, where the water 
would then go to the area around Johannesburg.38 This is to be achieved by a system of 
five dams and a tunnel to the Vaal, altering the natural course of the Orange/Senqu River. 
The LHWP adopted the Bank’s “Operational Directive on Environmental Impacts,” 
which requires a thorough investigation of possible environmental consequences, 
including human health and safety.39 However, no impact assessment was done for Phase 
1A. Under pressure following the devastating environmental and social impacts of Phase 
1A, an Environmental Impact Assessment was mandated for all aspects of Phase 1B as 
well as the entire project. Despite the acknowledgement of transboundary impacts by the 
Environmental Impact Assessment team, no Transboundary Impact Assessment was 
carried out. The reason for this oversight was that “[The World Bank] feared that 
assessing these impacts would severely delay implementation of Phase 1B.”40 Had they 
conducted the assessment, they would have found that a fully implemented LHWP would 
give the Lower Orange River an irregular flow, disrupting the livelihoods of those living 
                                                 
38
 Lori Pottinger. "A Brief History of Africa’s Largest Water Project | International Rivers." International 
Rivers. http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/africa/brief-history-africa-s-largest-water-project (accessed 
March 29, 2009).  
39
 Nico Willemse, "Actual versus Predicted Transbounday Impact: A Case Study of Phase 1B of the 
Lesotho Highlands Water Project," International Journal of Water Resources Development 23, 3rd ser. 
(2007): 459. 
40
 Willemse, "Actual versus Predicted Transbounday Impact,” p.460 
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in the other riparian nations.41 This dramatic change in the river system is unsustainable 
in the long run, as many ecosystems and communities downstream depend on the river. 
Disrupting the flow of the Orange River can be ecologically disastrous at every level, as 
dry land biota are also specifically adapted to the natural flow cycles of the river and 
depend on the regular delivery of water.42 Socially, the project will also have large 
impacts, as large-scale water projects are more likely to negatively affect communities 
living downstream than those living in the project area.43 Downstream communities, if 
adequately informed of the impact of the project, could have demanded compensation for 
their losses. However, this concession would have lessened the economic benefits of the 
project to South Africa, making the project a more expensive option.44 A “sustainable 
development” project would have had to meet the standards of impact assessment that the 
World Bank itself has mandated. In this case, it failed to do so, which brings into 
question the sustainability of the project. 
Another example of the lack of truly sustainability-focused action on the part of 
the World Bank is the fact that it did not conduct an adequate assessment of demand-side 
management options before funding the new supply-side infrastructure. Recent data 
shows that the project was not necessary at the time that it was implemented. The South 
African Department of Water Affairs admitted that no new supply of water is needed in 
Gauteng until 2025.45 In addition, the planners at Rand Water, the water supplier in 
Gauteng, suggested that the project could have been delayed 17–20 years if effective 
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demand-side management (DSM) projects had been implemented.46 In response to this 
evidence, the World Bank argued that postponing the Mohale Dam would increase 
construction costs.47 In choosing to invest in infrastructure that will cause ecological and 
social harm without investigating whether or not the project is actually needed, the World 
Bank has contradicted its sustainable development rhetoric, bringing to light the 
neoliberal drivers that lie beneath the discourse of sustainability. 
 
1.1.2 Johannesburg Water 
 
On the South African side, management of the water that has been transferred 
from the Orange River to the Vaal is delegated to private companies that are supported by 
transnational corporations. The failure of the state to provide adequate infrastructure has 
led the World Bank to strongly encourage the use of the private sector to allocate 
resources.48  This is market environmentalism on the municipal scale. The two main 
corporations that use LHWP water are Rand Water and Johannesburg Water. For the 
purpose of this essay, I focus on Johannesburg Water and its operations in Soweto, one of 
the townships of Johannesburg that supposedly benefits from the LHWP.49 Specifically, I 
investigate the use of prepaid meters and water tariffs that are justified through the logic 
of market environmentalism, which will later be contrasted with the idea of water as an 
enforceable human right through the discussion of the South African Constitutional Court 
case Maziuko v City of Johannesburg. 
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Johannesburg Water Pty, Ltd. was created as an independent company, with the 
city of Johannesburg as the sole shareholder. The transnational corporation Suez Water 
was awarded a five-year management contract with the idea that corporatization of the 
water sector would increase efficiency and Suez Water would introduce sanctioned 
business practices into water management and provision. Part of this process was strict 
enforcement of full-cost recovery beyond the 6,000 liters per month of free water 
mandated by the Free Basic Water Policy, a 2002 policy that established a basic amount 
of free water that should be available to all South Africans. This enforcement led to water 
shutoffs in Soweto, one of Johannesburg’s poorest townships.50 The World Bank insists 
that supplying clean water to the poor can be done through the private sector, but 
evidence suggests that enforcing full-cost recovery allows the rich to use as much water 
as they like while the poor continue to suffer from lack of access.51 Johannesburg Water 
uses pre-paid meters to enforce full-cost recovery, and they justify this through market 
environmentalism. The introduction of prepayment meters began with a public awareness 
campaign, Operation Gcin’amanzi, to educate citizens on how to stay within the 6,000 
liters a month through water conservation measures, emphasizing that having to pay for 
the extra water would be the result of wasteful use.52 This process conflated the issues of 
full-cost recovery and sustainability. 
The LHWP caused an increase in the price of water because part of the financing 
plan was to have the end-users pay the increased cost. The end-user, Rand Water and 
Johannesburg Water, passed this cost on to the consumer through price increases. As 
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prices rose, the ability of municipalities to collect payments from low-income residents, 
such as those in Soweto, fell.53 The use of pre-paid meters not only implemented full-cost 
recovery under the ideas of market environmentalism, but it changed the residents’ 
relationship with the state and water accessibility. During the apartheid era, nonpayment 
for services was one of the only means by which township residents could protest the 
state. Having to pay for water before use eliminated this channel of protest, therefore 
changing their relationship with the state and limiting expressions of agency. Von 
Schnitzler argues, “neoliberal reforms are seen to hinge on the construction of new forms 
of agency and, indeed, to work through the promotion of new conceptions and practices 
of citizenship.”54 The introduction of pre-paid meters under the vocabulary of 
sustainability, and the implementation of full-cost recovery through privatization, turned 
water into a measureable commodity and transformed the residents’ relationship with the 
state. The meters force residents to calculate how much water they are using and attach a 
monetary value, turning water into an exchangeable commodity. Their agency and 
relationship to the state is expressed through their ability to manage and purchase water 
as such.55 The language of sustainability that Johannesburg Water uses to justify the pre-
paid meters does not fully encompass the impact that it has had on the concept of water 
and citizenship in Soweto. It appears to be a thin veil over the economic considerations 
that drive the use of pre-paid meters to achieve full-cost recovery. 
Chapter Three will delve further into the introduction of prepayment meters in 
Soweto, and cut to the crux of the tension between neoliberal development policies, 
scarce resources, and human rights in South Africa.  This chapter will provide some 
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background for, and then follow the arguments of the Constitutional Court case Mazibuko 
v City of Johannesburg, wherein Soweto residents challenged the introduction of the 
prepayment meters as unconstitutional, asserting that they have a right to free water.     
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Chapter Two: The International Right to Water 
 
There is a central tension between the view of water as an economic good and an 
international humanitarian perspective that sees water as a human right.  The tension 
between these two views has increased as globalization has expanded, bringing with it 
multinational corporations such as Suez and national neoliberal reforms which have led 
to privatized water resources in developing countries.  Opponents of water privatization 
argue that introducing the logic of the market into water management is incompatible 
with guaranteeing basic rights to water, and invoke a human rights approach to support 
their claims.56  Water is essential for life and the fulfillment of other human rights, yet 
there is no explicit right to water in the major international human rights instruments. 
This section argues that the right to water can be constructed from other rights, as well as 
from less prominent documents and statements from the Committee on Economic and 
Social Rights.  First, I will review the major international human rights covenants and 
highlight the portions that support the right to water.  In the review of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, I will discuss the Committee’s 
General Comment 15, which explains the right to water.  Then, I will highlight relevant 
regional covenants that support the human right to water in Africa.  Finally, I will discuss 
mechanisms for the enforcement of this right. 
1.1 International Covenants 
 
 Three international covenants dominate the literature surrounding human rights: 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
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Cultural Rights (ICESCR).  The right to water is not explicitly protected in any of these 
documents. However an argument can be made that water is a necessary precondition to 
the fulfillment of other rights.  Scholars who argue for the existence of a right to water 
have based arguments in each of these documents.   
 
1.1.1 UDHR 
 
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948, and articulated 
the basic ideas of human rights, including universality and internationalism.  There are 
three provisions in this document that can be used to construct a right to water.  Article 3, 
which states “everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person”, Article 22 
provides that everyone have a right to “realization…of the economic, social and cultural 
rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality”, and 
Article 25, which provides for every person to have the “right to a standard of living 
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family”.57 The wording of 
Article 25 makes clear that the list of specific provisions, such as food and housing, were 
not meant to be all inclusive, but representative of the sorts of provisions that would 
allow people an adequate standard of living.  One of the essential components not listed 
is water, as satisfying the conditions of Article 25 would not be possible without the use 
of water. Water is an underlying requirement to satisfy the rights protected under the 
Articles listed.  Logic suggests that the framers of the UDHR would have considered 
water to be implicitly needed in order to meet the right that they described.  The right to 
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air is also not included, yet no one would deny how fundamental air is to human 
existence and the realization of human rights. 58 
These two articles are seen to be a basis for the right to water, as water is a 
precondition to realize these rights.  The UDHR is not binding upon states, and therefore 
neither are the two articles that imply a right to water.59  The subsequent covenants, the 
ICCPR and ICESCR, are not binding upon states either, but the ICCPR does contain 
enforcement mechanisms and the ICESCR has been clarified to include the right to water.  
Therefore, these documents can serve as stronger bases upon which to place the right to 
water.  
 
1.1.2 ICCPR 
 
 A basic supply of fresh water is essential to sustaining human life. It is possible 
that a right to water can be implied under Article 6 (1) ICCPR, which states: “Every 
human being had the inherent right to life.  This right shall be protected by law.  No one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”60  The right to life is subject to well-developed 
international enforcement mechanisms, and countries subject to the First Optional 
Protocol have a strict duty of compliance.  Article 6(1) is generally understood to be 
enforceable under national legal systems, if the given state has enacted such legislation, 
therefore if the right to water could be implied under this article, it would carry 
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significant weight. 61  However, the ICCPR is generally understood to contain negative 
rights, and the subsequent duty on the state is to not interfere.  Therefore, “it follows that 
article 6(1) ICCPR does not require a states party to take positive steps in order to ensure 
its citizens’ access to life-sustaining resources, but is limited to the state obligation to 
refrain from arbitrary deprivations of life”.62  Kiefer and Brölmann support a broader 
vision of the right to life, one that imposes a duty on states to preserve life and promote 
the right to live.  This would put states in a position where they would have to provide 
every citizen with the basic means of subsistence and a decent standard of life.  Kiefer 
and Brölmann write: “…the right to life in its modern meaning should be understood as 
belonging to both the realm of civil and political rights, and that of economic, social, and 
cultural rights; a view which incidentally provides an eloquent illustration of both the 
indivisibility and interrelatedness of all human rights”.63  According to this reasoning, the 
right to life would encompass positive subsistence rights such as the right to water.   
 Finding the right to water under the right to life would greatly expand the scope of 
Article 6 (1), which has been treated by states parties exclusively as a duty of non-
interference.  There is little evidence that states would support such a liberal 
interpretation; the article is read as a right to life, not a safeguard on all life.  Human life 
itself is not protected by law, what is protected is the right to not have life arbitrarily 
taken.  Keifer and Brölmann admit that “In the context of freshwater as a survival 
requirement, article 6(1) ICCPR cannot conclusively be considered to go beyond the 
evident negative guarantee against water being employed as a means for arbitrary 
                                                 
61
 Thorsten Kiefer and Catherine Brölmann, "Beyond State Sovereignty: The Human Right to Water," Non-
State Actors and International Law 5 (2005): 187. 
62
 Kiefer and Brölmann, "Beyond State Sovereignty,” p.188 
63
 Ibid 
 
 24 
deprivations of life”.64  The ICCPR can be used to construct a right to water, but it is a 
weak base. 
 
1.1.3 ICESCR 
 
 The ICESCR protects and promotes positive socio-economic and cultural rights, 
and serves as a much stronger basis for a constructed right to water.  The juridical basis 
for the right to water can be derived from Articles 11 and 12.  Article 11 recognizes “the 
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and 
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions”, and Article 12 
enshrines the “right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health”.65  While these two articles do not expressly mention the 
right to water, water is a necessary precondition to the fulfillment of these rights.66  As 
with the UDHR, water is a derivative right that can be logically inferred based on the 
stated contents of these articles.67 
 Economic, social, and cultural rights are a stronger basis for the right to water 
than civil and political rights, as they are regarded as welfare rights.  Welfare rights 
impose positive duties on the state to promote and fulfill the content of the right.  The 
realization of these rights depends largely upon state intervention.68 State intervention can 
take three forms; to respect, protect, and fulfill.  A state’s duty to respect a right is 
essentially a negative duty of non-interference similar to the duties imposed by the 
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ICCPR.  The duty to protect refers to the state’s obligation to prevent third parties from 
interfering with the enjoyment of the right in question.  Fulfillment of rights is a last 
resort, and can be broken down into facilitating the realization of the right, and providing 
the content of the right itself.  The duty to facilitate can also be understood as the duty to 
promote.  In the case of the right to water, promotion of the right would take the form of 
providing sufficient information and education for people to realize the right.  The use of 
water saving practices and technologies may also be important where indigent citizens 
are restricted to a small amount of water.69  Provision of resources, such as providing 
water free of charge, only occurs when citizens are unable to access the content of the 
right themselves.70  In the case of the right to water, the last resort is providing a basic 
amount of free water to those who cannot pay.   
An advantage to basing the legal right to water in economic, social and cultural 
rights is the idea of a “minimum core” content to this type of right.  The core content of a 
right is the “essential elements of the right, without which it loses its significance”.71  
Implicit in the idea of a minimum core is a basic amount of water that would be needed in 
order to meet requirements for certain human and ecological functions.  Peter Gleick 
writes: “A true minimum human need for water can only be defined as the amount 
needed to maintain human survival, approximately 3-5 l per day.  However, setting a 
minimum at this level would have little meaning: except in accidental rare circumstances, 
no one dies solely from a lack of water and studies show improvement in human health 
can be realized by increasing amounts of clean water up to about 20 l per person per 
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day”. 72   This number is in line with amounts that have been recommended by the 
USAID, the World Bank, the WHO, and the standards from the UN International 
Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade and Agenda 21 of the Earth Summit.  The 
international consensus then, is that 20 liters of water per person per day is the minimum 
core content of the right to water. 
 
1.1.4 General Comment 15 
 
The UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights confirmed that the 
right to water is implied in the ICESCR in its General Comment no. 15, entitled “The 
Right to Water (Articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights)”.  In this document, the Committee defines the right to water as: “the 
right of everyone to have at his or her disposal sufficient clean, acceptable, accessible and 
obtainable water for personal and domestic uses”.  The Committee argued that the right 
to water is included in Article 11 of the ICESCR, as the text of the right is such that the 
bases for an adequate standard of living are not exhaustive.73  Some, but not all, of the 
bases for adequate living are listed in the document.  Water is among the bases not listed, 
but it is integral to those listed such as food and shelter.  As A.E. Irujo wrote, “It is not a 
question of linking the right to water with an economic or social activity but of providing 
the elements for the development of life under basic conditions that are minimal (but 
sufficient) in terms of quality”.74  The Comment establishes a state obligation to realize 
the right to water, and to move as quickly and efficiently as possible towards the full 
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realization of this right.  States are obligated to prevent the infringement of this right by 
third party actors, including private water companies.75  This point is important, as it 
reflects the tension between water privatization and state protection of human rights.  
That the Committee specifically mentions protection of rights against private water 
companies implies that they view privatization as a potential obstacle to the full 
realization of the right to water.   
Although the ICESCR and General Comment no. 15 serve as convincing bases 
for the international right to water, neither of these documents are binding upon states.  
States are only obligated to take steps within their resources to reach the goals outlined in 
these documents, essentially giving them free rein to implement these rights as they 
will.76 
 
1.2 Regional Covenants 
 
 Regional human rights covenants are not covered in the literature that I reviewed 
for the purpose of this paper, however they can serve as compelling bases for a legal right 
to water.  In the South African case that will be thoroughly discussed later in this work, 
Judge Tsoka of the High Court cites two African regional human rights documents.  
Given that Judge Tsoka places his interpretation of this right partially in these documents, 
it is a worthwhile exercise to investigate how they protect the right to water.  
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1.2.1 African Charter 
 
 The African Charter of Human and People’s Right, created in 1981and also 
known as the Banjul Charter, guarantees everyone the “right to enjoy the best attainable 
state of physical and mental health.”77  This is similar to Article 12 of the ICESCR, which 
was found by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to be a basis for 
the right to water.  The African Commission on Human Rights found that failing to 
provide basic services, such as water, is a violation of this article.78  South Africa has 
signed and ratified this Charter, as well as the Protocol on the Establishment of an 
African Court on Human and People’s Rights.  The African Court on Human and 
People’s Rights is a regional court that rules on states’ compliance with the Banjul 
Charter.  That South Africa has ratified both the Charter in 1996 and the Protocol in 2002 
means that it is subject to the Court’s jurisdiction, and therefore can be held accountable 
to the provisions of the Charter.  This enforcement mechanism makes the Charter a 
strong base for the right to water in the states party to it. 
 
1.2.2 African Convention on Rights of the Child 
 
 The African Convention on the Rights of the Child (ACRC) is the other regional 
convention that is mentioned by Judge Tsoka in his decision.  Article 14 concerns health 
and health services.  This article reflects Article 16 of the Banjul Charter, and goes a step 
further in saying: 
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2. State Parties to the present Charter shall undertake to pursue the full 
implementation of this right and in particular shall take measures: … 
(c) to ensure the provision of adequate nutrition and safe drinking water79  
 
This convention was signed and ratified by South Africa, and specifically highlights the 
right to safe water.  While there is no enforcement mechanism for this convention that is 
equivalent to the African Court, the explicit mention of safe drinking water serves to 
clarify the meaning of physical and mental health that is enshrined in the Banjul Charter.  
The Articles are very close to one another in content, and the ACRC was written in 1990 
and adopted in South Africa in 2002.  The ACRC is nine years younger than the Banjul 
Charter was written, and was adopted by South Africa six years later than the Charter was 
adopted.  Based on the similarity between the two articles, as well as the clarification by 
the African Commission that the provision of basic services is included in Article 16, it is 
possible to see that the ACRC is a logical continuation of the Banjul Charter.  Therefore, 
the explicit mention of safe water in the ACRC serves to strengthen the legal basis for a 
right to water under the Charter. 
 
1.3 Enforcement 
 
 One of the major problems with basing a right to water in international human 
rights documents is that these documents are not binding upon states.  Therefore, it is 
difficult for the international community to enforce of the rights guaranteed in the 
documents.  The ICCPR has an Optional Protocol that allows individuals to make 
complaints for quasi-judicial review, but the ICESCR has no such resource.  Given that 
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the ICESCR is a stronger basis for the right to water, this section will investigate possible 
enforcement mechanisms for the right to water as found under the ICESCR.    
 
1.3.1 International Monitoring 
 
There is no procedure for individuals to make a complaint based on the ICESCR, 
as is allowed by the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.  The rights guaranteed under the 
ICESCR can be seen as vague, as there is no body of case law to clarify the content of the 
rights.  However, given the recent clarification of rights through the General Comments, 
as well as developments in the academic literature such as the Limburg Principles and the 
Maastricht Guidelines, it is becoming more difficult for states to argue that the 
expectations of the ICESCR are unclear.  Kiefer and Brölmann argue that there is no 
reason why the right to water should not be subject to quasi-juridical enforcement, and 
suggest a method by which to enforce it.  They offer an “integrated approach”, used by 
the Human Rights Committee in the past to assert that the non-discrimination clause of 
article 26 of the ICCPR is also applicable to social, economic, or cultural rights.  That is 
to say “…if a state party to the ICCPR, the First Optional Protocol and the ICESCR seeks 
to implement the right to water as implied in the ICESCR through legislation, and the 
national law were to prove discriminatory in the sense of article 26 ICCPR, the injured 
individual in principle would have recourse to the individual complaints procedure under 
the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR”.80  This could offer possibilities for 
enforcement that are greater than the current system of state reporting, but the judgment 
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would still be under article 26, not under the right to water.  Therefore, the right to water 
would not actually be enforced under this system. 
 
1.3.2 Justiciability 
 
 The international covenants encourage states parties to adopt their tenets into 
domestic law.  Domestic legislation that incorporates the rights contained in the ICESCR 
would make those rights justiciable on the national level.  There are several advantages to 
a justiciable right to water.  First, the ability to enforce the right to water in courts would 
act as a check against government and corporate interests that could interfere with 
citizen’s ability to access basic water.  This balance of power is particularly important in 
the face of increasing instances of privatized water companies operating at full-cost 
recovery.  Second, it would send the message to the nation that socio-economic rights are 
as important as civil and political rights, and should be approached with equal respect.  
Third, justiciability would allow national courts and tribunals to practically apply and 
therefore clarify the meaning of water rights in different contexts.81  A body of case law 
could be compiled to guide future decisions about water rights, and the meaning of 
“progressive realization” could become more concrete. 
 Until recently, the only court cases concerning the right to water had been decided 
in lower national courts.  The first water rights case to reach the highest court in a state is 
Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg, which was decided by the South African 
Constitutional Court in October of 2009.  This was the most significant test of the 
justiciability of water rights to date.  This case also contains important themes concerning 
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the tension between the right to water, scarce resources, and the neoliberal development 
scheme of the South African government.  The next chapter will delve into the 
circumstances surrounding the Mazibuko case, and trace the case as it moved up through 
the South African court system.  Mazibuko is at the intersection of competing 
development ideals, and thus serves as an important case study for the consequences of 
the intersection between human rights, scarcity, and economic globalization. 
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Chapter Three: Mazibuko 
 
 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg was the first case concerning the human right to 
water to reach the highest court in a state.  The progressive history of the Constitution of 
South Africa and the Constitutional Court underpin the importance of this case to the 
future of a justiciable right to water.  Essentially, some of the residents of Phiri, a 
neighborhood in Soweto, claimed that the introduction of prepaid water meters under 
Johannesburg Water’s Operation Gcin’amanzi was unconstitutional.  In order to fully 
delve into the issues that this case addressed in its three hearings on different levels of the 
South African court system, it is essential to understand the setting in which this case 
took place.  To this end, I will provide a brief overview of the water policies in South 
Africa, the procedural issues when approaching a case based on the Constitution, and 
finally the Phiri case. 
 
3.1 South African Water Law 
 
 Water law in South Africa has evolved since the fall of the apartheid government.  
The 1996 Constitution contains a right to water in section 27.  Water legislation in South 
Africa must be considered in light to this right, as well as others included in the 
Constitution such as the right to equality, dignity, life, property, and administrative 
justice.  The new government extensively reviewed water law with an eye for issues of 
equity.  It initiated a consultative process for developing new guidelines for future water 
legislation, and the result was the White Paper on a National Water Policy for South 
Africa.  This White Paper explained that in 1997 12-14 million South Africans, out of 40 
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million, were without access to safe water.82  This was a result of inequitable water 
infrastructure that was installed during apartheid.  The government’s new water 
legislation would be driven by its initial development vision, the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP), issued in 1994.  The RDP promised to meet basic 
needs, develop human resources, build the economy, and democratize the state.83   Water 
was one of the fundamental municipal resources specifically mentioned in the RDP.  
Improved access to sufficient, sanitary water was seen as part of the government’s 
promise to redress historical injustice exercised against poor black citizens.84   
However, the new South African government bowed to pressure from the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and in 1996 adopted the Growth, 
Employment, and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR).  GEAR purports to implement the 
RDP, but actually fundamentally transitions the national development strategy away from 
social welfarism and towards neoliberal principles of development.85 Andrew Magaziner 
explains the effect GEAR had on water policy, saying: “GEAR thrust water delivery 
responsibility firmly on the shoulders of local municipalities, while the government 
simultaneously decreased its social spending and financial support for city council 
operations.”86  Magaziner argues that in this situation, cities such as Johannesburg made 
the inevitable choice to privatize municipal services and institute cost recovery 
mechanisms.  Some citizens, including the applicants in the Mazibuko case, saw this as a 
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betrayal of the promises made under the RDP.  The first post-apartheid water minister, 
Kader Asmal, stated: “The RDP makes no reference to free water to the citizens of South 
Africa.  The provision of such free water has financial implications for local government 
that I as a national minister must be extremely careful enforcing on the local 
government.”87  Indeed, his first policy mandated the supply of water to consumers at the 
marginal cost – the price equivalent to the cost of operating and maintenance costs for an 
additional unit of water.  John Roome offered him the advice that private management 
contracts would be more difficult to establish and maintain if consumers had an 
expectation of receiving free water.  John Roome is also the World Bank’s task manager 
for the Lesotho Highlands Water Project.88  It was in this political climate that new water 
legislation was drafted in South Africa. 
 
3.1.1 National Water Act 36 of 1998 
 
 The National Water Act (NWA) of 1998 transformed South Africa’s laws 
governing water resources.  The NWA was a comprehensive reform, abolishing private 
ownership of water, placing all water resources in a public trust, and establishing a 
compulsory licensing system that promised to facilitate equitable distribution of the 
country’s water resources.  However, it also adopts or facilitates a number of neoliberal 
policies, including decentralizing water resource management to municipalities, 
privatization, and full cost recovery.  Rose Francis argues that in this way the NWA 
blocks the government’s objective of universal access to clean water.89  The NWA 
decentralized the management of water resources by establishing parastatal catchment 
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agencies to manage water on the level of broad watersheds.90  Each municipality then 
either manages its own water services infrastructure or issues a contract to a private firm 
to manage water services.  The water catchment agency for Johannesburg is Rand 
Water,91 and the water management body in Johannesburg is Johannesburg Water. 
 A portion of the NWA that is relevant to the Mazibuko case is section 59(4), 
which provides that a person must be given the opportunity to make representations, or 
explain to the water services agency why they should not have their water cut off, within 
a reasonable period before any restriction or shut-off of water services is imposed.92  The 
residents of Phiri contend that they were not able to make representations before their 
water was restricted or shut off by Johannesburg Water.  The Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) includes a similar provision in section 3, 
stating that administrative decisions must be procedurally fair.  This definition of fair 
includes adequate notice to citizens, and the opportunity for citizens to make 
representations.93 
 
3.1.2 Water Services Act 108 of 1997 
 
 The NWA operates along with the Water Services Act (WSA).  The WSA 
outlines the establishment, the powers, and the responsibilities of water service agencies 
such as Johannesburg water. The WSA secures in Section three the right of everyone to 
have access to basic water supply and sanitation, thereby conforming to the 
Constitutional right to water, and mandates the construction of sufficient pipes to bring 
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piped water within two hundred meters of every dwelling.94  The WSA gives the duty to 
water service providers, including private suppliers, to take “reasonable” measures to 
realize these rights.  The procedures for the limitation or discontinuation of water services 
must be fair and equitable, and should not be enacted as punishment for non-payment in 
the event that a customer can prove that he or she is unable to pay.95  In the Mazibuko 
case, the applicants say that Johannesburg Water did not follow the law of the Water 
Services Act when it installed pre-paid water meters and shut off water to whose who 
could not pay. 
 
3.1.3 Free Basic Water 
 
The Free Basic Water Policy (FBW), as detailed in August 2002, defines the 
amount of free basic water as “25 litres per person per day, which is a level sufficient to 
promote healthy living. This amounts to about 6000 litres per household per month for a 
household of 8 people.”96  It takes note of the fact that 6000 liters may not be enough to 
cover waterborne sanitation needs, and that local authorities have the discretion to either 
provide less water where the infrastructure does not exist or more water where it is 
needed.97  The policy Regulations Relating to Compulsory National Standards and 
Measures to Conserve Water of June 2001 hold the same numbers, and add that the 
source must be within 200 meters of the household, with a minimum flow rate of 10 liters 
per minute, and be with an effectiveness that no consumer is without water supply for 
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more than seven full days.98  
The 2003 Strategic Framework for Water Services formally recognized the FBW 
Policy, which all local municipal authorities are legally obliged to implement.  FBW, 
while mandating a lifeline amount of free water, makes clear that any water consumed 
above the 6kl per person per day must be paid for, in accordance with the principle of full 
cost recovery.99 
 
3.2 Procedural Issues 
 There are certain procedural issues that go along with Constitutional litigation.  
The plantiffs – or “applicants” as they are referred to in South African civil cases - in the 
Mazibuko case challenged the installation of prepayment water meters in Phiri on 
constitutional grounds.  They argued that the plan that included prepayment meters was 
unconstitutional under section 27, which concerns the right to water.  In this section, I 
will discuss the conditions that must be met before a case can be heard under Chapter 
Two of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights. 
 
3.2.1 Conditions for Bill of Rights litigation 
 
 Section 38 of the Constitution considers standing before a court, and qualifies that 
anyone protected under the Bill of Rights and acting in their own interest, acting as a 
member of or in the interest of a group, or acting in the public interest may bring a 
complaint before a court.100  The applicants in the Mazibuko case have standing before 
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the court, as they are citizens of South African acting in their own interest, the interest of 
their group, and the public. 
 There are certain conditions that must be met for Bill of Rights litigation.  The 
court must initiate compliance with certain procedural guidelines before considering the 
substantive claims made in a case.  These compliance procedures include determining the 
breadth of the specific Bill of Rights provision in question, how it should be interpreted, 
and if any Section 36 limitations apply in the case at hand.101 
The breadth of Section 27 was considered individually by each court, and to 
different outcomes.  These considerations are discussed in depth in the second part of this 
chapter, wherein I dissect the rulings made by each court.  The other standard that must 
be explored by the court before addressing substantive issues is whether or not the rights 
infringement is allowed under the Constitution.  Section 36 of the Constitution is the 
“limitations clause”, it establishes the boundaries on generally applicable rights, and 
outlines the types of situations in which the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights can be 
intruded upon or restricted.  The limitation must be justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, and the specific nature of the right 
in question.102  Whether or not the limitations clause is applicable is decided on a case-
by-case basis, and each judge that heard the Mazibuko case made their own judgment on 
section 39, and each found that it did not apply in this case.103   
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3.3 Phiri water case 
 
 The Mazibuko case is also known as the Phiri Water Case, as all of the applicants 
are residents of Phiri, a neighborhood in Soweto.  This section will provide some context 
for the Mazibuko case by describing the Phiri neighborhood, and then explaining the 
stories of the applicants and their specific complaints against the City and Johannesburg 
Water.  Then I will review the response by the City to these complaints.  After setting the 
context to this specific case, I will review the arguments made by the judges in the High 
Court, the Supreme Court of Appeals, and the Constitutional Court that go to the larger 
debate of enforcement of socio-economic rights in a context of scarce resources and 
neoliberal development policies. 
 
3.3.1 Phiri 
 
 Phiri is a township in Soweto, in Johannesburg, that is bordered by Mapetla and 
Moraka.  It was established during the apartheid era as an ethnic enclave for Sotho and 
Tswana peoples.  Tens of thousands of low cost homes were constructed in its early 
development, most of which lacked indoor plumbing or working toilets.  Homes were 
gradually electrified during the course of the 20th century.  Following the end of the 
apartheid government in the 1990s, a housing shortage occurred in Phiri, resulting in 
some two thousand informal backyard dwellings.  Phiri has a population density of over 
180 persons per hectare, which is overcrowded even by Soweto standards.  Households 
rarely have a separate bathroom, and there is generally a high level of water loss through 
outside taps and antiquated standpipes.104  Water service delivery came through taps or 
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standpipes, and households paid a flat rate based on an assumed consumption level.  
Around 10% of households in Soweto paid their water bills in the early 2000’s.105  It was 
in this environment that Johannesburg Water, along with the City of Johannesburg, 
introduced Operation Gcin’amanzi, a form of market environmentalism, by installing 
prepaid water meters to reduce non-payment and increase efficiency in Soweto.  The first 
area to receive these meters was Phiri. 
 
3.3.2 Complaint by applicants 
 
 The applicants in the case of Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg protested the use 
of these prepayment water meters on several grounds.  In this section I will introduce the 
applicants whose stories illustrate the relevant complaints against the prepayment meters, 
and the grounds upon which they challenged Operation Gcin’amanzi in the court system.  
The basis of the case, as well as the arguments made therein, is more extensive and 
detailed than the portions covered in this thesis.  The debate over market 
environmentalism versus the human right to water is only one of the many issues that this 
case addresses.  However, only the portions that pertain to the issue at hand in this thesis 
will be highlighted. 
The first applicant, Lindiwe Mazibuko, was 39 years old at the time of the case.  
Sadly, she passed away from an illness not long after the decision of the High Court was 
handed down.106  She had 20 people in her household, including 6 boarders, 3 babies, and 
6 school-age children.  Many of these people, including her aging mother, had health 
problems.  The total monthly income of the household was R1300, which was not enough 
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money to pay all expenses and the water bill beyond the free basic amount allocated to 
them. Ms. Mazibuko says that the free water never lasted the entire month, and usually 
ran out by the 12th or 15th of each month.   Her household was without water for more 
than half of every month, and could not always afford to buy more water.  After the 6000 
liters was finished, it was shut off without any warning.  In a household of 20, such as 
Ms. Mazibuko’s house, 6000 liters a month makes for only 10 liters per person per day, 
which is well below the 25 liter minimum standard required for direct consumption, food 
preparation, and personal hygiene.  Ms. Mazibuko herself states in her affidavit: “The 
amount of 6 kilolitres free water we are supplied with is simply not enough for our entire 
household’s basic needs. This is despite the fact that we use water only for our basic 
needs. We cannot use less water in our household than what we are using at the 
moment.”107  Ms. Mazibuko is affiliated with the Coalition Against Water Privatisation 
(CAWP), a community group that is part of the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF).  Trevor 
Ngwane, a former African National Congress (ANC) councilor and head of the regional 
ANC in Soweto, who was dismissed from the ANC because of his critique of 
privatization of municipal services, founded the APF at the start of Operation 
Gcin’amanzi.108  A research report from CAWP that Mazibuko cites in her affidavit 
found that there are an average of 16 people per household in Phiri, twice the number the 
government assumes.109  She claims that her quality of life has significantly decreased 
since the installment of the pre-paid water meters. 
The second applicant is Grace Munyai, a 43 year old unemployed adult woman 
who owns a property in Phiri along with her husband, who is employed.  Her household 
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consists of six people, and she had a niece, Sizile, who died of AIDs in April of 2004.  
Her household’s only source of water is a standpipe in the yard that was connected in 
November of 2004.110  When the standpipe was installed they were only given the choice 
between the pipe and prepaid water meter.  Before the pipe was installed they went 
without water in their home for six months while the community was protesting the 
installment of prepaid water meters.  During this time Sizile was very sick, in the 
terminal stage of AIDs.  The family members had to walk 3 kilometers to collect water 
for household use and to wash Sizile’s blankets.  Grace Munyai states: “There was no 
way to get sufficient water for our most basic needs: caring for Sizile, our personal 
hygiene, cleaning the house, drinking and cooking”.111  Even after the pipe was installed, 
it is inconvenient for them to have to run into the yard for water, and Johannesburg Water 
workers check on them often to make sure that they have not tampered with the 
standpipe. 
The third applicant is Jennifer Makoatsane, a 35-year-old unemployed woman, 
living in Phiri with her 61 year old mother and 7 others.  There are a total of 9 people in 
her household.  They received a prepayment water meter in November of 2004, and the 
water did not last through the month.  The family had to change their cleaning habits in 
order to conserve water, which proved especially challenging given that there was a 
newborn baby.  In January, her father suffered a stroke, and his foot became infected with 
gangrene.  They were forced to buy more water after the free amount ran out because her 
father’s foot needed to be cared for lest his health deteriorate further.  Her father died on 
February 14th, 2005, and their whole family came for the funeral, putting further stress on 
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the water supply.  Makoatsane states, “I feel that my rights to water and human dignity 
have been violated”.112 
The applicants argued that the pre-payment meters are not a reliable source of 
water, as they only provide water for about half of the month. Furthermore, the 
installation of pre-paid meters has reduced residents’ access to water, representing a step 
backward in the progressive realization of the right to access sufficient water as protected 
in the Constitution.  The applicants asserted that the National Standards Regulation 3(b), 
which legally sets the minimum standard of basic water supply outlined in the Free Basic 
Water Policy at 25 liters per person per day or 6 kiloliters per household per month, is 
unconstitutional, as it does not meet the standard of access to sufficient water that is 
guaranteed in the Constitution.  Even if 25 liters per person per day were sufficient, the 
clause of 6 kiloliters per household per month violates section 9(3) of the Constitution, as 
it incidentally directly or indirectly discriminates against poor black people who live in 
large households and cannot pay for water beyond the basic free water allotment.113  All 
of these charges cut to the heart of the critiques of market environmentalism.  Operation 
Gcin’amanzi uses neoliberal development techniques through enforcing payment for 
water services, while the applicants argue that this strategy violates their constitutional 
and human right to water because they are unable to pay for the service. 
 
3.4 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 
 
 The Mazibuko case was decided in three different courts over the course of two 
years.  This section aims to pit these three decisions against each other, compare their 
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arguments, and gauge the reactions of the South African people through commentary in 
the print and online media.  The main topics of contention between the three courts are as 
follows: the interpretation of section 27 of the Constitution (s27), the role of foreign and 
international law in influencing South African courts, the definition of “sufficient” water 
and if there is minimum core content to s27, the concept of progressive realization of 
socio-economic rights, and the constitutional test of reasonableness.  Each of these topics 
will be considered in turn, as will their significance to the tension between neoliberal 
development strategy and human rights.  However, before considering the reasoning 
behind the decisions, it is important to know the outcome of each decision.  
The High Court of South Africa, Witwatersrand Local Division, was the first 
body to hear this case.  The hearing was from the 3rd to the 5th of December, 2007, and 
the judgment was handed down by Judge M P Tsoka on April 30th, 2008.  Judge Tsoka 
ordered that the forced installation of the pre-payment water meters in the Phiri Township 
by the City of Johannesburg and Johannesburg Water without the choice of only a pre-
payment meter or a standpipe is unconstitutional and unlawful.  He found that the 
prepayment system as a whole in Phiri is unconstitutional and unlawful. Judge Tsoka, 
through his decision, makes clear that he supports the human rights side of the debate at 
hand, and ordered City of Johannesburg and Johannesburg Water114 to provide each of 
the applicants and similarly placed residents of Phiri with 50 liters per person per day of 
free basic water, and the option of a metered supply of water to be installed at the cost of 
the City.  
The order of the Supreme Court of Appeals was technically a victory for the 
Mazibuko team.  However, once the text is further inspected, it is possible to glean the 
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ground gained by the City in this appeal.  The order as written by Judge Streicher is as 
follows: 
The appeal is upheld and the order by the court below [the High Court] is 
replaced with the following order: 
1. The decision of the first respondent and/or the second respondent to 
limit the free basic water supply to the residents of Phiri to 25 liters per 
person per day or 6kl per household per month is reviewed and set aside.   
2. It is declared: 
(a) That 42 liters water per Phiri resident per day would constitute 
sufficient water in terms of s 27 (1) of the Constitution. 
(b) That the first respondent is, to the extent that it is in terms of s 27(1) of 
the Constitution reasonable to do so, having regard to its available 
resources and other relevant considerations, obliged to provide 42 liters 
free water to each Phiri resident who cannot afford to pay for such water. 
3. The first and second respondents are ordered to reconsider and 
reformulate their free water policy in the light of the preceding paragraphs 
of this order. 
4. Pending the reformulation of their free water policy the first and second 
respondents are ordered to provide each account holder in Phiri who is 
registered as an indigent with 42 liters pf free water per day per member of 
his or her household. 
5. It is declared that the prepayment water meters used in Phiri Township 
in respect to water service level 3 consumers are unlawful. 
6. The order in paragraph 5 is suspended for a period of two years in order 
to enable the first respondent to legalise the use of prepayment meters in 
so far as it may be made possible to do so.115 
 
 While Judge A. Streicher, seems to have followed the ruling of Judge Tsoka, he 
deviates from the harder precedent set by the High Court in two important respects.  First, 
he lowers the amount of water considered to be the minimum core amount that the City 
should provide free of charge from 50 liters to 42 liters per person per day.  Second, he 
gives the City leeway in saying that it should reconsider its water policy in light of its 
available resources and by suspending the removal of prepaid water meters for two years 
so that the City can amend its bylaws to make the meters legal.  By ordering the City to 
provide a high amount of water for free, Judge Streicher is supporting the argument that 
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there is a right to water.  However, he also allows the City to legalize prepayment meters, 
signaling that he also supports the privatization of water services. 
Justice Kate O’Regan wrote the Constitutional Court’s decision.  The case was 
heard on September 2nd, 2009, and the decision was given on October 8th of the same 
year.  Justice O’Regan set aside the orders of the two lower courts.  She found the Free 
Basic Water policy to be fair, and the system of prepayment meters to be constitutional.  
Her decision supports the market environmentalism and neoliberal development policies 
of the state on the surface, but has an underlying argument for the right to water.  She 
makes the case that the City is making progress towards the realization of the right to 
water through the use of prepayment meters.  Given scarce resources and the expense of 
delivering water services, the court does not have the power to challenge the City’s plan 
so long as it is working towards fulfilling its obligations under Section 27 of the 
Constitution. 
 Now, with the three decisions in mind, I will turn to the reasoning behind these 
orders, and explore how each court interpreted the major issues in this case.  Through this 
analysis, it is possible to see the right to water disappear as the courts attempt to reconcile 
it with the existing development strategies of the South African government. 
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3.4.1 Interpretation of Section 27 of the Constitution 
 
The constitutional basis of this case is section 27, parts 1 and 2, of the 
Constitution.  This section states: 
27. Health care, food, water and social security 
   1. Everyone has the right to have access to - 
         1. --- 
         2. sufficient food and water; and 
         3. --- 
   2.  The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within 
its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of 
these rights.116 
 
The three courts had different interpretations of s27.  Judge Tsoka of the High 
Court only briefly addresses his interpretation of this section of the Bill of Rights.  He 
views section 27 through the lens of section 39(1)(b), which states that a Court 
interpreting the Bill of Rights must consider international law, and in terms of section 
233, which provides that a interpretation of legislation consistent with international law 
must be preferred.117  His conclusion is that “…the State is obliged to provide free basic 
water to the poor”118 under s27 (1), and under s27(2) the respondents are obliged to 
provide more than the minimum amount of water if the residents need more water, and if 
the City is able to provide more water within its available resources.  The amount of 
water that Judge Tsoka found “sufficient”119 was 50 liters per person per day, he ordered 
the City to provide this amount to citizens for free.  
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The implication of this order for the City was sizeable, considering that at the 
time of the ruling they were providing free water at only 6kl per household per month.  
The City contended that free water is not fiscally or environmentally sustainable, and that 
they are under pressure to collect payments since they do not get the water for free from 
their suppliers.120  This argument reflects the pressure of neoliberal economic 
development on government facing scarce resources with high demand.  Not only does 
the City see the practice of providing free water as environmentally unsustainable given 
the arid climate where Johannesburg is located, they are also under an obligation to profit 
from the water industry.  This tension makes the fulfillment of the socio-economic right 
to water, as ordered by Judge Tsoka and based in his use of international law, logistically 
difficult. 
Judge Moroa Tsoka’s ruling sparked a debate in the South African media.  On one 
side, the supporters of the applicants hailed his decision as a landmark case, the first case 
in which the courts ruled on the side of the poor and disadvantaged, setting a precedent 
for juridical enforcement of socio-economic rights in South African jurisprudence and 
worldwide.121  The other side, including Johannesburg mayor Amos Masondo, criticized 
Judge Tsoka for making policy, and overstepping the boundaries of the power of the 
courts.122  While supporters in the media hailed Judge Tsoka’s approach of setting a hard 
line for the enforcement of rights, ultimately the arguments in favor of neoliberal 
development and market environmentalism proved stronger in the minds of Judges 
                                                 
120
 Reuters AlertNet. "South Africa: Court ruling on water sets "global precedent"" May 06, 2008. 
121
 UN Integrated Regional Information Networks. "South Africa; How Much Free Water is Enough." 
Africa News, December 14, 2007. 
122
 Liebenberg, Sandra. "Crucial leaks in mayor's attack on water ruling." BusinessDay, May 20, 2008. 
http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/Content.aspx?id=47901 (accessed February 22, 2010). 
 50 
Streicher and O’Regan, and the other two courts took a less hard-line interpretation of 
Section 27.  
Judge Streicher of the Supreme Court of Appeals addressed the interpretation of 
s27 with a method used by the Constitutional Court in Soobramoney v. Minister of Health 
(KwaZulu-Natal).  In that decision, Chief Justice Chaskalson wrote:  
“…the obligations imposed on the state by sections 26 and 27 in 
regard to access to housing, health case, food, water, and social 
security are dependent upon the resources available for such 
purposes, and that the corresponding rights themselves are limited 
by reason of the lack of resources.  Given this lack of resources 
and the significant demands on them…an unqualified obligation to 
meet these needs would not presently be capable of being 
fulfilled.”123   
 
In other words, according to Section 27, everyone may have the right to access to 
sufficient water, but everyone does not have a claim to immediate fulfillment of that right 
if the resources are not available to the government to provide the infrastructure and 
services that the right requires.  Citizens’ ability to claim their rights under Section 27 is 
subject to the availability of resources.  This interpretation is a reflection of the logic of 
neoliberal development and limited resources, in this case the limited amount of water 
and money to build water infrastructure.  If the City cannot pay to provide this water and 
water delivery infrastructure to the citizens for free, then it is not under obligation to do 
so.  The responsibility of securing access to water falls to the consumers, who must be 
able to pay for the water in order to access an amount beyond the six kiloliters per 
household her month mandated by the FBW policy.  Their right to access water is 
constrained by their ability to pay for the service.  This is a departure from Judge Tsoka’s 
claim that everyone has right to immediate fulfillment of the right to water, expressed 
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through the order on the City to provide “sufficient” water in the amount of fifty liters per 
person per day for free.   
The Constitutional Court’s interpretation of Section 27 largely agrees with that of 
the Supreme Court of Appeals, though is expressed much more clearly.  Justice O’Regan 
writes that Section 27(1) of the Constitution creates a right to access sufficient water.  
The creation of this right imposes certain obligations on the state.  Justice O’Regan then 
investigates what kind of obligations are imposed on the state in her discussion of the 
relationship between Section 27 (1) (b) and Section 27(2), which reads “The state must 
take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve 
the progressive realization of each of these rights”124 She says that the state’s role in the 
protection of human rights is traditionally to uphold negative rights, otherwise known as 
non-interference.  However, in this case the question is to what extent the state can be 
held to a positive obligation to fulfill the right to water.  To answer this question, Justice 
O’Regan turns to two previous decisions, Grootboom125 and Treatment Action Campaign 
No. 2,126 to illustrate how the Constitutional Court has dealt with questions of obligations 
imposed on the state by positive human rights in the past.  Basing her opinion on these 
earlier decisions, Justice O’Regan asserts that it is clear that the right does not require the 
state to provide every person with sufficient water upon demand, but rather requires the 
state to take reasonable legislative and other measures, within available resources, in 
order to work towards the progressive realization of the right to water.  As long as the 
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state is taking steps towards fulfilling the right, it is considered to be fulfilling its 
constitutional obligation.  Therefore, citizens cannot appeal to the Constitution for 
immediate fulfillment of the right to water.  Given that governments face limited 
resources, the immediate fulfillment of this right is impossible, and the Court cannot 
place impossible demands on the City.  The City does not have the resources to provide 
water beyond FBW amount, because it cannot afford to do so.  It cannot afford to provide 
this water, because it is operating under a development strategy that requires it to recover 
the full cost of the service that it provides.  Again, the logic of neoliberal development 
overcomes the arguments for a human right to water in the court’s interpretation of 
Section 27. 
 
3.4.2 Role of Foreign & International law  
 
 An important and unique part of the South African Constitution is Section 39, 
which instructs courts in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights.  This section states: 
39. When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum - 
1. must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom; 
   2. must consider international law; and 
    3. may consider foreign law.127 
 
Section 39 of the Constitution is important to the larger theme of this paper, the 
intersection of development and human rights in developing countries.  As was seen in 
Chapter Three, a right to water can be constructed in international law.  If the courts 
choose to rely heavily on international law in their decisions, then we could expect to see 
a consensus that there is an immediate right to water.  However, if the courts did not rely 
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heavily on international law and instead based their decisions on domestic law and the 
constraints of resource availability, we would see a consensus that there is not an 
immediate right to water.  All three courts had unique interpretations of their duties under 
Section 39, with significant effects on the outcomes of their rulings. 
The High Court interpreted Section 39 differently than the other two courts, as 
Judge Tsoka was the only authority to rely upon foreign law to support his reasoning.  He 
relies on case law from lower courts in Brazil and Argentina to illustrate the unlawfulness 
of that discontinuation of water supply to indigent people due to non-payment.  The 
highest court in the State of Parana in Brazil found in 2002 that “the disconnection of 
needed water supply constitutes a violation of human rights – even if it is the result of a 
non-payment”.128  In the matter of Users and Consumers in Defence v Aguas del Gran 
Buenos Aires in 2002 an unspecified Argentine court found that the water company is not 
entitled to interrupt service and supply of water, as access to fresh water is a human right 
which all inhabitants of a country must be granted, regardless of ability to pay.  The Civil 
and Commercial First Instance Court of Cordoba, Argentina, found again in 2002 in 
Quevedo Miguel Angel y ortos cl Aquas Cordobesas SA Amparo, Cordoba City, Juez 
Sustituta de Primera Instancia 51 Nominacion en 10 Civil y Comercial de la Gudad de 
Corboda that the disconnection of water supply to low-income and indigent residents 
because they could not pay was unlawful.  These decisions support the human rights 
approach to water delivery services, as they condemn the logic that access to water 
should be limited by access to the market, or the ability to pay. 
Judge Tsoka made use of international law in his investigation of the existence of 
the international right to access to fresh water.  He justified his use of international law in 
                                                 
128
 Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others, at paragraph 86 
 54 
this case through two previous cases in South Africa, Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v 
Southern Metropolitan Local Concil 2006 (6) BCLR 625 (W) and The Government of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC).  
Both of these cases stress the importance of international law when interpreting the Bill 
of Rights, including both binding and non-binding international law.  On this basis, he 
turns to several sources of international law to support the right to water.  First, Judge 
Tsoka looked to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), and argued that Article 11 and 12 implicitly recognize the right to water 
through the rights to an adequate standard of living and the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health.  United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights General Comment No. 15 of 2002 emphasizes the right to accessibility 
and availability of fresh water.   Accessibility means that water should be both physically 
and economically accessible to all people regardless of economic status, while 
availability means that water supply must be sufficient for each person for personal and 
domestic use as well as continuous. Judge Tsoka writes: “The effect is that the right to 
water must be accessible equally to the rich as well as to the poor and to the most 
vulnerable members of the populations.  It is in this context that the State is under an 
obligation to provide the poor with the necessary water and water facilities on a non-
discriminatory basis.”129  He takes a logical leap with the use of the word “obligation” to 
describe the responsibilities of the state to the poor, and does not provide a basis for this 
conclusion.   
Judge Tsoka highlights in his decision that General Comment 15 explicitly states 
that the State has a constant and continuing duty to work towards the progressive 
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realization of the right to water.  While the term “progressive realization” is somewhat 
intentionally vague, the Committee also says that retrogressive measures are prohibited, 
so the State cannot do anything that would reduce existing accessibility or availability of 
water.  The applicants argued that the prepayment meters greatly reduced the availability 
and accessibility of water in Phiri.  The Convention of the Rights (CRC) of the Child and 
its African equivalent (ACRC) specifically state in Article 24 of the CRC and Article 14 
of the ACRC that the State has an obligation to fully implement the right of children to 
the highest possible standard of health and to combat disease through the provision of 
adequate food and drinking water.  The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 
guarantees in Article 16 the right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health.  The African Commission on Human Rights found that failure by the State 
to supply basic services, such as water, is a violation of this right.  Judge Tsoka finds that 
it is clear from this international law, along with the South African Bill of Rights, that the 
State is obligated to provide free basic water to the poor.  This conclusion is another 
logical leap for which he provides no basis; however it does show Judge Tsoka’s support 
to the human right to water regardless of the existence of scarce environmental or 
financial resources. 
Judge Streicher of the Supreme Court of Appeals made use of international law 
for a more limited purpose than did Judge Tsoka.  He employed international law to 
answer the question of whether or not the City must provide access to sufficient water for 
free.130   In his written decision, he first turns to General Comment 15, as did Judge 
Tsoka.  He points out that this General Comment says that water, along with water 
facilities and services, must be affordable and accessible for all, including the most 
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vulnerable or marginalized sections of the population.  This must be true in law and in 
fact.  He dismisses the City’s assertion that it does not have to provide free water under 
the Water Services Act, which expressly states that a person who has demonstrated that 
they cannot pay for water must not be denied water service because of non-payment.  He 
says that the City has realized that it holds the responsibility to provide free water, as 
evidenced by its, as of the time of the case, unimplemented Free Basic Water 
Implementation Strategy Document.  This document recommends 10kl free water per 
household per month be provided to households based on land valued below a certain 
amount, and that no free water be given to households valued above that amount.  This 
policy was to be implemented in July of 2008.  While the whole strategy has not been 
adopted, the City adopted interim measures in 2007 that include using the indigents list to 
determine which households are eligible to receive 10kl of free water per month.  The 
City argued to the court that it has limited resources and must recover the full cost of its 
services. High-income users already heavily subsidize water use by lower income users, 
and the City cannot afford to give more free water than the basic amount to those who 
cannot pay for the service.  There are other demands on the City’s resources, such as the 
many more households without any basic access to water. Judge Streicher finds that the 
current free water policy was adopted because the City made an error when it assumed 
that the Water Services Act superseded Section 27(1) of the Constitution, and thought 
that while they were obligated to provide 25 liters per person per day or 6kl per 
household per month, it was not for free.  Therefore, having found that the City must 
provide sufficient free water under international law and domestic law, Judge Streicher 
decided to set aside the free water policy of the City on the grounds that a right to access 
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sufficient water exists, and the City has demonstrated that it has the ability to grant this 
access.  This decision straddles the two extremes in the debate over the nature of water.  
On one side, Judge Streicher finds that there is a right to water, and that the City must 
provide sufficient water free of charge.  However, he finds that it must provide free water 
only based on the conclusion that the City can afford to provide this service because it is 
within its available resources.    This condition supports the idea that water must be paid 
for by someone, and idea that is unavoidable in a market economy. 
Justice O’Regan of the Constitutional Court does not rely on international or 
foreign law when considering the constitutionality of the Free Basic Water policy and the 
use of prepayment meters.  She mentions it only once, when considering the concept of 
progressive realization, and how it relates to the existence or non-existence of a minimum 
core content to Section 27. The concept of “minimum core” originates in international 
law, in General Comment 3 (1990) of the United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights.   
The use of foreign and international law decreased as the case moved up the 
hierarchy of the courts.  As the use of foreign and international law substantively 
decreased, so did the benefits of the decision for the applicants.  From this pattern it is 
possible to conclude that an enforceable right to water begins to disappear as the court 
moves away from the international level, i.e. human rights documents, and grounds its 
decisions more in domestic law and policy.  The next step is to investigate why this 
happens, and this will be addressed in the next sections, which address the existence or 
non-existence of a minimum core content to s27, the legality of prepayment meters, and 
the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of progressive realization.   
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3.4.3 “Sufficient” water and minimum core 
 
 Section 27 of the Constitution states that everyone has a right to sufficient water.  
In this case, the applicants claimed that the state was not fulfilling that right, since 6kl of 
water per household per month is not sufficient.  Therefore, it fell to the courts in this 
case to weigh evidence presented to them in order to determine an amount of water that is 
“sufficient”.  This exercise was designed to give a core content to the right, and was 
followed by the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeals.  The Constitutional 
Court, however, rejected the idea of a minimum core content to the right to water, as it 
had with other socio-economic rights in previous decisions. 
 Judge Tsoka of the High Court referenced the World Health Organization (WHO) 
guidelines in order to determine what is meant by sufficient water.  The WHO guidelines 
provide 25 liters per person per day as the basic amount of water required to maintain life 
over the short term.  These 25 liters per person per day for purposes of consumption, and 
does not assure hygiene.  The Free Basic Water Policy in South Africa states that the 
minimum quantity of potable water provided should be 25 liters per person per day.  
“Minimum” means that cities are free to provide more at their discretion, and some 
places such as Volksrust in KwaZulu-Natal do provide more than the minimum amount 
to their residents.  Given that water is a scarce resource, and that South Africa must 
import water from other countries such as Lesotho, Judge Tsoka finds it understandable 
that the minimum amount provided for in the Free Basic Water Policy be 25 liters per 
person per day.   
Judge Toska found that under Section 27(2) of the Constitution the respondents 
are obliged to provide more than the minimum amount of water if the residents needs 
 59 
demand it, and if they have the available resources to provide more water. He found that 
the residents do have a need for more than the six kiloliters per household per month that 
the City provides them.  Many households contain more than eight people, the number of 
people used to calculate the allowance, and many households have heightened sanitation 
needs due to illness.  These two circumstances require more than six kiloliters per 
household per month of free basic water.  Judge Tsoka ordered that each resident be 
giving fifty liters of water per person per day. 
To support this decision, he relies on the affidavits of an expert that was presented 
to the court by the applicants, Peter Henry Gleick, the President of the Institute for 
Studies in Development, Environment, and Security. Gleick argues that, based on his 
substantial international comparative research, the Basic Water Requirement (BWR) for 
human needs is 50 liters per person per day.  These 50 liters encompass cleaning, 
hygiene, drinking, cooking, and basic sanitation.  Gleick goes on to state that the 
residents of Phiri need this much water every day due to their specific situation.  They 
live in a hot, dry climate, and therefore require drinking water.  Phiri is a crowded urban 
environment where the residents need to maintain sanitation, and cannot rely on rivers for 
bathing.  Food needs to be washed and cooked in order to assure healthy eating.  Six 
kiloliters per household per month is not enough to provide 25 liters per person per day in 
a place where the average household size is 16, and is certainly not enough to provide 50 
liters per person per day.  
Judge Tsoka finds that waterborne sanitation is essential to life in Phiri, and for 
the respondents to expect the applicants to conserve water through the use of prepayment 
meters to the detriment of their health is to deny them the right to lead a healthy and 
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dignified life.  In this context, twenty-five liters per person per day of free water is 
insufficient.  The city has the financial capacity to increase the amount of water provided 
to the applicants.  The policies that have been adopted by the respondents to partially 
relieve water shortages while still imposing prepayment meters show that they also have 
the resources to provide more than 25 liters per person per day.  Judge Tsoka reasons that 
the respondents can provide 50 liters per person per day without straining their capacity 
to provide water or their financial resources.  He does not give a basis for this reasoning. 
Jackie Dugard, a senior researcher and director of the Centre for Applied Legal 
Studies at the University of Witswatersrand, and a member of the applicants’ legal team 
expressed the importance of Judge Tsoka’s ruling in an interview with the Inter Press 
Service.  Dugard described how South Africa has a constitution that is very strong on 
socio-economic rights, however the Constitutional Court has chosen to adopt a test of 
reasonableness rather than a minimum core standard.131  They look at whether or not the 
government policy that provides the context for the rights is reasonable.  Judge Tsoka 
went beyond the reasonableness test and investigated if the minimum core of the right to 
water was being respected in this case.  He relied heavily on international law in order to 
determine the content of the right to water to provide the state with a meaningful standard 
by which to judge reasonableness.  Judge Tsoka stated in his decision that the 
Constitutional Court had not rejected the concept of the minimum core; it had just not 
seen fit to use it in the two socio-economic cases that it had heard,132 as the minimum 
core in those cases was too difficult to determine due to the nature of the rights in 
question.  However, in the case of water rights, “without providing a basic content to the 
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right to have sufficient water, the right remains devoid of content”.133 
The City of Johannesburg argued that it had fulfilled its duty to the progressive 
realization of the applicants’ right to water through the prepaid water meter system, since 
the applicants were paying less than under the meter system and receiving free water for 
the first time.  In its view, market environmentalism was working in Phiri by delivering 
an economically efficient amount of water.  The residents are better off now, according to 
the City, especially after the amount of free water was increased to ten kiloliters per 
person per day for registered indigents and people with HIV/AIDS.134 
The legal team for the Phiri applicants, along with the Anti-Privatisation Forum 
and the Coalition Against Water Privatization, were optimistic that the High Court’s 
hard-line human rights based ruling concerning the core content of the right to water 
would be respected in the Supreme Court of Appeals.  Jackie Dugard released a statement 
saying, “Judge Tsoka showed that socio-economic rights have teeth.  His judgment shows 
a careful and sensitive understanding of the law, the City’s obligations, but above all our 
client’s lives”.135   
Judge Streicher of the Supreme Court of Appeals did indeed find that there is a 
core content to the right to water.  He reasoned that, since the heart of the Constitution is 
a commitment to equality and human dignity, it follows that the right to access sufficient 
water is a right to access the amount of water that is necessary for a person to live a 
dignified life.  He finds support for this conclusion in General Comment 15, specifically 
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the portion which discusses the necessity of water for the realization of other rights, and 
that the amount of water must be adequate for human dignity.  The amount of water 
which is considered to be adequate relies on the circumstances in which the person or 
people in question are living.  Judge Streicher goes on to analyze how much water is 
needed to live a dignified life in Phiri.  He looks to the Water Services Act minimum 
amount of twenty-five liters per person per day, or six kiloliters per household per month, 
and concludes that this minimum must have been set in terms of communities that do 
have waterborne sanitation, since the evidence suggests that a flush toilet dispenses of 
approximately 10 liters of water with each flush.  Phiri does have waterborne sanitation, 
and nobody had suggested that twenty-five liters per person per day is enough water to 
lead a dignified life in Phiri, nor could anyone suggest this given the evidence provided.   
 Judge Streicher questions the claims of the applicant’s expert witness, Peter 
Gleick, concerning the core content to the right to water, and weighs them against the 
assertions of the expert witness called by the City, I.H. Palmer. Palmer is a civil engineer 
and the managing director of a consultancy company that offers expertise on water 
supply and sanitation.  He takes a different view on how much water is required for a 
dignified life in a Highveld climate, such as the one in which Phiri is situated, concluding 
that 41.2 liters per day would be sufficient.  Judge Streicher sees no reason offered by 
either party as to why Gleick’s testimony should be given more weigh than Palmer’s, and 
concludes that forty-two liters of water per person per day would constitute sufficient 
water in terms of Section 27(1) of the Constitution. 
 Justice O’Regan of the Constitutional Court also addresses the claim of the 
applicants that the Court should give content to the right to water by setting a minimum 
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amount that is considered to fill the definition of “sufficient”.  Historically, the South 
African Constitutional Court has rejected the concept of a minimum core.  In Grootboom 
the Court rejected this notion, citing concerns of the Court’s ability to determine a 
minimum core that would facilitate the progressive realization of the right without all of 
the information about what the deliverance of the right entails.  Justice O’Regan also 
cites Treatment Action Campaign, in which the Court explained that it is not in the 
position to issue orders that could have multiple unforeseen social and economic 
consequences.  The role of the Court is to hold the state to its constitutional obligations 
and determine the reasonableness of its actions, not to make decisions that have 
budgetary implications.  Decisions that would affect the budget should be left to the 
legislature, where the democratic process can take place.  In other words, the Court does 
not find it appropriate to interfere with the development strategy that has been 
implemented by the government.   
This is the point where we see the ability to enforce socio-economic rights vanish. 
The Constitutional Court stands by the assertion that the legislature and the executive 
should be the primary places for socio-economic rights to be realized, and the Court does 
not want to interfere with this process by setting a minimum standard.  They do not insert 
a rights-based approach to development into the market-based strategy that is used by the 
government.  The right to water, as understood in international law, vanishes when the 
Court does not intervene in the market-based system of development that grants access to 
resources based on the ability to pay. 
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3.4.4 Progressive realization and standard of reasonableness 
 
The idea of progressive realization supports neoliberal development strategies 
through giving states some leeway in the enforcement of rights. The text of Section 27 
(2), which states that the state must take steps towards the progressive realization of the 
right to water, implies that the right cannot be fulfilled immediately.  Justice O’Regan 
argues that this means the people cannot demand immediate fulfillment of the right to 
water.  The Constitution and the Courts are in place to hold the state accountable for the 
manner in which they seek to pursue these rights, to make sure that they are working 
towards the realization of socio-economic rights.  Progressive realization gives the 
government an obligation to continually review its policies in order to work towards the 
achievement of the right for all people, but frees it from the obligation to grant the right 
immediately.  The fact that the City has, within the period of litigation, reviewed its 
social services policy and amended it in an effort to bring basic water to more people is 
evidence that the City is working towards the progressive realization of the right to water.   
The Constitutional Court has rejected the idea of a minimum core content to 
socio-economic rights, and instead employs a test of “reasonableness” of the policies 
used to implement these rights.  Justice O’Regan considers the reasonableness of the 
City’s Free Basic Water policy as it was in 2007 when the High Court rendered its 
judgment.  Recognizing that the policy has since changed, she explains the three levels of 
service that are offered to consumers: Service Level 1, which provides for communal taps 
that consumers do not pay for, Service Level 2, which provides for yard standpipes for 
which consumers pay a fixed fee, and Service Level 3, which provides for metered 
connections and consumers pay according to their usage.  Every consumer in the City 
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receives six kiloliters of water for free every month, and beyond that must pay for their 
consumption.  The tariff system for water is a rising-block system, so every unit of water 
is more expensive than the last unit.  Water is priced at the marginal cost of producing the 
next unit, a strategy employed in the logic of market environmentalism.  As water gets 
more expensive, the cost will deter waste.  The effect of this tariff system is that heavy 
water users cross subsidize those that use less water, normally poor households.  Poor 
households that have an income of less than twice the highest government grant plus R1 
are able to register for the City’s indigent registry.  Once on the registry, they must accept 
the installation of prepayment meters for water and electricity, and they receive ten free 
kiloliters of water per person per household.   
The applicants argued that the City’s Free Basic Water policy is unreasonable 
because it provides free water to everyone regardless of income, it is formulated per 
household instead of per person, it is based on the misconception that they were under no 
obligation to provide free water, and the amount of water allocated is insufficient for 
large households.  Justice O’Regan takes each of these arguments in turn.  She found that 
the policy of providing all households with free water to be reasonable on the grounds 
that households that use more water are charged for their heavier water use, and it is 
difficult to establish a method to target households that are more deserving of free water 
than others.  Justice O’Regan found the City’s policy of allocating water per household 
rather than per person to be reasonable because, given the number of informal settlements 
and the continual movement of people within the city, it is too administratively difficult 
to determine how many people occupy each household.  The applicants also argued that 
the policy was based on the City’s misunderstanding that is was not under an obligation 
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to provide a specific amount of water for free.  However, given Justice O’Regan’s 
conclusion that the City is not obligated to provide a minimum core amount of water for 
free, but simply to work towards the progressive realization of the right to water, she 
concluded that the policy is not inconsistent with the Constitution or unreasonable.  
Justice O’Regan found the FBW Policy to be reasonable despite the fact that the amount 
allocated may be insufficient for large households.  The fact that the amount of free basic 
water may be insufficient is an unavoidable result of establishing a universal allocation.  
It is difficult to determine where large households are, as often they are located in 
informal settlements such as Phiri.  However, raising the basic level of services to 
accommodate these large households would be expensive and inequitable, since it will 
still disproportionately benefit residents with smaller households.  
 An article in Business Day by Eusebius McKaiser celebrates the tight legal 
arguments made by Justice O’Regan in her decision.  He examines the court’s 
reasonableness test for the enforcement of socio-economic right in government policy, 
saying, “This requires a delicate balancing act. The court should not dictate the content of 
socioeconomic policies. That is the government’s prerogative, and it is desirable because 
the government has a popular mandate for policy creation, while the courts do not.”136  
The Court did not attempt to establish a minimum core to the right to water, instead 
investigating whether or not the government had demonstrated that it is working towards 
the progressive realization of the right to water.  McKaiser discusses how this case 
illustrates the importance of the Constitutional Court not overstepping its boundaries, and 
believes that the reasonableness test is a powerful tool for accountability to the rights 
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guaranteed in the Constitution, while maintaining the market-based development policies.
 Jackie Dugard responded to McKaiser’s article, saying she believes that the 
litigation was strategic and successful, even though the Court did not rule in their favor.  
It was successful because it raised the profile of issues surrounding water privatization 
and the right to water.  The loss itself can be used strategically to show the gap between 
constitutional ideals and the real conditions of poverty, and perhaps to push the 
legislature towards adopting legislation to bridge these gaps and end inequalities.137 
 Not all members of the Phiri team were so gracious in their defeat.  The Coalition 
Against Water Privatization wrote a post on the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign’s 
blog accusing Justice O’Regan of lazy legalism and bias.  The post mentions that the 
decision was unanimous among the Constitutional Court justices, but does not allow this 
to be an excuse for what they believe to be a clear mistake on the part of the judges.  The 
CAWP’s major complaint, beyond the fact that the Court seemed to take the City and 
Johannesburg Water at their word about the success of the programs, is that the judges 
accept that the City has a duty to work towards sufficient water for all people, however 
they refuse to set a minimum core quantity as a goal.  They argue that there is “no 
foundational of time/spatial basis upon which to adjudge what constitutes ‘progressive 
realization.’”138 
This is a problem inherent in the idea of progressive realization that is at the heart 
of the debate over the nature of water.  However the reasonableness test may be the best 
option for the present, given that South Africa was not left with many economic 
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resources after the end of apartheid.  The CAWP as well as legal experts were 
disappointed that the Constitutional Court did not engage the content of the right to water 
by establishing a minimum core, arguing that progressive realization is meaningless 
without a normative goal to aspire to.139  The Court’s ruling does limit the ability of 
people to hold the state accountable to a goal, but it does assert the fact that the state must 
continue to make changes and work towards fulfilling the right to water.  In essence, the 
Constitutional Court’s decision supports the argument that a right to water exists 
theoretically, but cannot be enforced in the face of market-based development strategies 
and limited resources. 
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Chapter Four: Implications of Mazibuko for Right to Water 
 
 The larger tensions between neoliberal development schemes and the idea of the 
right to water came together in the Mazibuko case.  All three courts had to weigh 
concerns of individual rights, sustainability, and economic development while deciding 
how to proceed in this application.  This case was the first right to water case to be heard 
in the highest court of a state, and South Africa has taken a role as a leader in national 
enforcement of socio-economic rights.140  Therefore, the approach that the Constitutional 
Court took to the case sets an important precedent for the feasibility of judicial 
enforcement of the right to water.  This judgment, as well as the larger trends in the 
Constitutional Court’s history of socio-economic rights cases, must be investigated in 
order to distill lessons that could affect the enforcement of the right to water in other 
developing countries.   
The main question is: Can the right to water be enforced on a national level?  In 
order to answer this question, it is necessary to discuss two topics.  First, I will discuss 
the justiciability of socio-economic rights in South Africa, and how the Mazibuko case 
reinforced previous decisions by the Constitutional Court.  Then, I will review how the 
implications of the Mazibuko judgment and the Constitutional Court’s approach to socio-
economic rights affect the enforceability of the right to water through the judicial system.  
I will conclude that, while the right to water can be constructed on an international level, 
national enforcement is not currently feasible.  Finally, I will offer some of my own 
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thoughts concerning how activists for the right to water in South Africa, as well as the 
nation of South Africa, can move forward towards realizing the right to water.   
 
4.1 Justiciability of socio-economic rights 
 
 The justiciability of socio-economic rights is an emerging subject.  Civil and 
political rights are generally negative rights, the right to be free from state interference.  
These are generally considered to be justiciable, as they require the court to order the 
state to stop an action.  Socio-economic rights, however, are generally positive rights that 
require supplemental state action.  Enforcement of these rights would require courts to 
order the state to do something, such as supply all citizens with sufficient water.  The 
1996 Constitution contains a Bill of Rights that includes civil and political rights as well 
as socio-economic rights, and was envisioned to be fully justiciable.141  Since the 
adoption of the Bill of Rights, the ability of the Constitutional Court to enforce socio-
economic rights has been tested in several cases that include the Mazibuko judgment.   
The Mazibuko case served as a test for the Court to either solidify the approach that it has 
taken in previous socio-economic rights cases, or to diverge from their trend and take a 
different approach.  The two possible approaches that the Court could have taken were 
the “reasonableness” test that was developed with the case of Soobramoney v Minister of 
Health, or to adopt a “minimum core” approach, which would have given solid content to 
the right to water.  First, I will explain the origin of “minimum core”, and why the 
Constitutional Court has rejected this notion in its previous cases and in this case.  Then, I 
will explain the development of the “reasonableness” test and how it was applied in the 
Mazibuko case. 
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4.1.1 Minimum core  
 
 The United Nations Committee on Economic and Social Rights developed the 
concept of minimum core content to a socio-economic right in 1990, equating it to a legal 
entitlement and an obligation of strict liability that the state has to its citizens.142   In the 
Committee’s General Comment no.3, they reflect upon the language contained in Article 
2.1, which encourages states to “to take steps, individually and through international 
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly 
the adoption of legislative measures.”143  The right to water in section 27 of the South 
African Constitution contains the same language in s27 (2), providing that the state must 
take “reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve 
the progressive realization”144 of the right to water.  The idea of progressive realization 
could be interpreted to give states an excuse for not implementing the rights in the 
Covenant, and for cities to not enforce the right to water.  In order to prevent this 
shortcoming, the Committee developed the idea of a minimum core content to each 
socio-economic right.  Without a minimum core, the Committee is of the opinion that the 
Covenant would lose its reason for being, as there would be no content to the rights 
contained within.  A minimum core would also establish a way to measure the progress 
of the states party to the agreement, and assure that the citizens of those states would 
have their rights fulfilled.  The core content would function as the floor below which no 
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state can fall, and “In order for a State party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at 
least its minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources it must demonstrate 
that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort 
to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations.”145  In the case of the right 
to water, having a minimum core content would make the right to water more easily 
enforced by the judiciary.  It would give the court a standard by which to measure the 
actions of the state, and it could judge whether or not the state had met the standard. 
 The High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeals both adopted the minimum 
core standard in their judgments, while the Constitutional Court rejected it.  The 
reasoning behind the Court’s rejection of the minimum core standard lies in previous 
cases heard since the 1996 Constitution came into effect.  The central concern of the 
Court has been the availability of state resources.  This concern was first voiced in 
Soobramoney v Minister of Health, a case that brought the right to healthcare to the 
Constitutional Court.  The Court ruled that the applicant, Mr. Soobramoney, was not 
entitled to weekly dialysis under s27,146 as ruling in his favor would have mistakenly 
prioritized terminal illnesses over preventing threatening medical conditions and 
therefore limited the state’s ability to fund preventative healthcare programs.  This 
decision showed extreme deference, signaling an early indication of its continued 
hesitation to assert a judicial voice in traditionally legislative or administrative matters.147  
The Court outright rejected the minimum core standard in Minister of Health and Others 
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v Treatment Action Campaign and Others in 2002, asserting that “it is impossible to give 
everyone access even to a ‘core’ service immediately.  All that is possible, and all that 
can be expected from the state, is that it act reasonably to provide access to the socio-
economic rights identified in sections 26 and 27 on a progressive basis.”148 
The practice of not interfering with other branches of the state that began with 
Soobramoney developed into a rejection of the minimum core content of a right, as 
asserting a minimum core could have policy and budgetary repercussions.  The 
implication of a rejection of minimum core for the right to water is that there is no 
quantity that can be asserted as the minimum amount of water that the state must supply 
in order to comply with the Constitution.  Citizen’s ability to seek immediate relief under 
the Constitution is therefore significantly limited.   
The Court rejected the minimum core in the Mazibuko case because they believed 
that asserting a minimum core content to the right to water would have budgetary 
implications.  The Constitutional Court maintained that it is not their place to make 
decisions that are best left to the executive and legislature, where the democratic process 
should take place.  Justice O’Regan writes: “The Constitution envisages that the 
legislative and other measures will be the primary instrument for the achievement of 
social and economic rights.”149  Therefore it is beyond the power of the Court to decide 
the quantity of water that should be the minimum amount provided. 
4.1.2 Reasonableness 
 
The Court has developed an alternate standard by which to judge progressive 
realization.  This standard is a test of reasonableness, and was developed in the course of 
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Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and others, a case 
that addressed the right to housing in 2001.  In this case, the Court rejected the minimum 
core argument, instead focusing on whether or not the housing policy adopted by Cape 
Town’s provisional government was a reasonable method to fulfill its obligations under 
s26 of the Constitution.150 The reasonableness test looks at plans, policies, or programs of 
the government that are designed to achieve the progressive realization of the rights 
contained within the Constitution.  The general evaluation of reasonableness consists of 
three parts.  First, the action must have “substantive measures that are comprehensive, 
coherent, flexible, balance, and feasible.  It must have a workable legal and 
administrative infrastructure (mere framework legislation is insufficient), and it cannot 
exclude large swaths of people.”151  If the plan does exclude a large portion of the 
population, then it must provide a justification for why those people are not included.  
Second, the rate at which the action is implemented must reflect progressive realization.  
In order for the government to satisfy its constitutional obligations it must move towards 
the goal as quickly as possible, but does not need to achieve the goal immediately.  
Finally, the reasonableness of an action is weighed against the government’s available 
resources.  However, the indigent component of a plan must be implemented with more 
urgency, and must be entirely government funded, therefore the state has less budgetary 
discretion than with non-indigent programs.  If a party sues the government to contest the 
constitutionality of an action, as happened in the Mazibuko case, the burden of proof rests 
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with the plaintiff.152  That is, the applicants must prove that the state’s plan is 
unreasonable. 
The Constitutional Court has been criticized for this approach.  Critics claim that 
the reasonableness test is not far-reaching enough, and does not provide grounds for 
immediate relief from hardships.  The minimum core approach would provide a 
minimum baseline standard for the Court to enforce as a starting point for progressive 
realization.153  In the case of the right to water, a minimum core approach would provide 
a minimum quantity of water that the state is obliged to provide, whereas with the 
reasonableness test it must only prove that it is implementing policy and infrastructure to 
expand water services. 
 
4.2 Implications for the right to water 
 
The approach that the Constitutional Court took in the Mazibuko case, coupled 
with the overarching circumstances in South Africa, has consequences for the 
justiciability of right to water. One of the main reasons that the Constitutional Court cites 
for rejecting the minimum core approach to socio-economic rights is that it would 
interfere with the budget.  The Court shies away from decisions that would influence the 
macro-economic policy of the state, and the water infrastructure falls under the umbrella 
of macroeconomic policy.  As demonstrated earlier in this thesis, South Africa’s water 
policy is influenced by its larger neoliberal economic strategy.  This neoliberal economic 
strategy was adopted under the pressure of globalization, and has not succeeded in 
improving the conditions of those living in poverty or in the delivery of water 
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infrastructure to all citizens.154  Rose Francis predicted in 2005 that the government’s 
Free Basic Water policy would stand the test of reasonableness, stating “given that the 
Constitutional Court will interpret the constitutional right to water as merely a 
governmental obligation to the population rather than the right of an individual to a 
specified quantity of water, the government is not legally required to provide every single 
person with immediate access to potable water.”155  Justice O’Regan makes a similar 
argument in Mazibuko, saying that the obligation imposed on the government under s27 
(1) and (2) of the Constitution “…requires the state to take reasonable legislative and 
other measures progressively to achieve the right of access to sufficient water within 
available resources.  It does not confer a right to claim ‘sufficient water’ from the state 
immediately.”156   
Why does the Constitution not give citizens the right to claim sufficient water 
immediately?  The government does not have the means to provide sufficient water 
immediately, and even if the Court were to order it to do so, it would be unable to.  Given 
that the government runs public utilities under a system of full-cost recovery,157 and that 
there are multiple socio-economic rights that require government funding and 
implementation,158 “the lack of government institutional capacity to finance and deliver 
public goods might undermine the right to water.”159  It is clear from the Mazibuko 
judgment that the City of Johannesburg lacks the capacity to immediately fulfill the right 
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to water, and to that end the Court asks it to demonstrate a reasonable plan for the 
progressive realization thereof.  The right to water can be constructed on an international 
level, but when taken to enforcement at the national level in South Africa, the state lacks 
the ability to enforce and deliver access to sufficient water. 
 
4.3 Flowing Forward 
  
More than a year of research on the topic of water rights enforcement has lead me 
to a bleak conclusion.  It appears that the current global economic system and natural 
resources limitations make the enforcement of water rights impossible.  Water is the 
ultimate common resource; all people need it and yet there is not enough for all of the 
demands to be met.  As illustrated by this thesis, the commodification and privatization of 
water contributes to its economic inaccessibility.  In this section, I will discuss what 
tactics are used by non-governmental organizations to promote water rights, and then 
offer my opinion concerning tactics that would be more effective.   
There are community, national, and international organizations that have made it 
their mission to assist with access to clean water.  These organizations range from the 
Mvula Trust, established in 1993 in South Africa to support community-driven water and 
sanitation projects160 to Charity:Water and the Global Water Initiative, which are large 
international non-governmental organizations.  Charity: Water works to install wells and 
sanitation facilities in developing countries to provide direct relief,161 while the Global 
Water Initiative builds its projects on the Integrated Water Resources Management 
Approach (IWRM).  This approach stresses protection of the environment, improving 
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access to water and sanitation through community capacity building, and supports 
lobbying in favor of improved water policies. 162   These organizations all work from a 
grassroots based, and include community empowerment as part of their goals.  Their 
tactics are noble, but do not seem to generate the kind of widespread change that would 
be necessary to immediately fulfill the right to water.   
The trend that runs through these three examples as well as the others that I have 
encountered is that they have two targets for their work.  The first target is people without 
access to water, the rural or urban poor that lack the infrastructure or economic ability to 
easily obtain sufficient water.  They are supported through community building and 
technological transfer.  The second target is government agencies responsible for water 
policy, which are targeted through lobbying.  This approach leaves out a major actor in 
the water services sector: private water companies.  Corporate Accountability 
International, as well as the Anti-Privatization Forum that aided the applicants in the 
Mazibuko case, are two organizations that have specifically targeted the privatization of 
water.163  However, even in these cases the organizations approach water access from a 
human rights perspective, a tactic that we saw failed in the Mazibuko case. 
Water rights need to be re-examined in the context of the larger conversations that 
served as a framework for this thesis.  There are many different debates that serve as a 
background for understanding the complex nature of enforcing the right to water, so why 
are water rights activists using limited discourses in advocating for the right to water?  As 
we have seen with the Lesotho Highlands Water Project case, there are global processes 
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at work behind development strategies and resource scarcity.  The LHWP was 
constructed in order to provide Johannesburg with more water because the city was 
growing, and the current amount of water was not enough to support the anticipated 
economic growth.  In order to understand the nature of the water scarcity problem in 
Johannesburg and the resulting lack of access to water experienced by Ms. Mazibuko and 
the other residents of Phiri, there must be an understanding of more than the international 
right to water.  Scholars of water rights need to conduct further research into how global 
phenomena affect the ability of individuals to access fresh water.  Research must be done 
on the effects of industrial agriculture in water stressed areas, and if and how efficiency 
gains can be made to increase the amount of water available for personal use.  If the 
amount of water used by agriculture is protected, then why is it protected?  Scholars must 
delve deeper into the politics around water use, as well as the science of hydrological 
systems.  Are large inter-basin transfers such as the LHWP an effective remedy for water 
shortages?  Is there a future in desalinization programs?  There are only a few of the 
many questions that need to be asked, and are being asked, about the right to water. 
Although a right to water can be constructed from international human rights law, 
it is impossible to enforce the right to water in a developing country that employs a 
neoliberal development strategy and faces scarce resources.  This thesis has demonstrated 
the limits of a human-rights approach to ensuring universal access to clean water, but it 
has also begun the search for a new approach to enforcing the right to water.   
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